

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


UNCLASSIFIED

Declass-17

ARMY TACTICAL AIR

SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

*and TRENDS IN AIR-GROUND
METHODS. (A.F.F. Bulletin)*



This document is now unclassified, as shown on the cover or title page, and all other markings found on any pages are obsolete. If any photocopies are made of this document, all markings, other than UNCLASSIFIED, on each page should be obliterated so that there is no misunderstanding of the current classification of any information derived from it.

REGRADED *Unclass. Aug* BY AUTHORITY
OF *DAAG # 83008-17*
BY *Peters* ON *1/20/83*

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTENTS

	Page
Staff Study, Army Tactical Air Support Requirements	1
A General Review of U. S. Tactical Air Support in Korea, 28 June 1950 - 8 September 1950	6
Infantry Battalion TACP's	67
Plan for Coordination of Supporting Weapons of an Infantry Division Including Artillery and Air	75
Tactical Air Request Net ROK Divisions	86

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS X CORPS
APO 909 US ARMY

25 December 1950

ARMY TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

1. PROBLEM: To determine the Army's requirements for tactical air support.

2. ASSUMPTION: That solution of the problem must be based upon Army needs, devoid of Air Force or budgetary policies, priorities, or missions.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. While budget limitations and Air Force stated overall requirements may possibly conflict with Army tactical air support requirements, consideration of such factors in this study would serve only to cloud the fact that the Army has the primary interest in tactical air support.

b. Operations in Korea during 1950 have provided an excellent medium for determining Army tactical air support requirements. Both requirements and many indicated means for meeting them have been brought sharply into focus by comparing the tactical air support provided by Fifth Air Force with that of the 1st Marine Air Wing. From the Army standpoint the 1st Marine Air Wing has been superior in every respect, as follows:

<u>FACTOR</u>	<u>1ST MAW ADVANTAGE</u>	<u>FIFTH AF DISADVANTAGE</u>
(1) Type of A/C	Designed for tactical air support.	Designed for fighter missions primarily.
(2) Mission	Tactical air support its primary mission.	Tactical air support not higher than third priority as mission.
(3) Training	Extensive air-ground training, complete familiarity with and understanding of supported unit tactics, problems and techniques.	Virtually no air-ground training initially, but methods of supporting ground units are now under development.
(4) TACP's	One per Inf Bn and higher unit - 13 per Inf Div.	One per Inf Regt and higher unit - 4 per Inf Div.
(5) Control	Senior ground commander in operational control.	Senior Air Force commander in operational control, cooperating with senior Army commander.

- | | | |
|-------------------|--|--|
| (6) Organization | Definitely designed for tactical air support of units down to Inf Bns. | Designed for primary missions other than tactical air support. No specific allocation of numbers of squadrons per army or corps. |
| (7) Communication | Simplified, local. | Complicated, insufficient, requiring Field Army - Tactical Air Force level detailed control. |

4. DISCUSSION: Annex A.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. Tactical air support aircraft should be designed for that primary function. The Army should be a party to stating characteristics and should share budgetary justification responsibility with the Air Force.
- b. The primary mission of tactical air units should be tactical air support.
- c. Joint air-ground training in all echelons, utilizing the same units to perfect teams, is of overriding importance.
- d. One TACP per Inf Bn and higher unit should be part of T/O&Es.
- e. Field Army or separate Corps commanders should have operational control over supporting tactical air units.
- f. Tactical air units should be organized and employed on the minimum basis of at least one squadron (24 planes) per Inf Div or one group per Corps of three Inf Div's, with additional squadrons per Field Army. A preferable apportionment of air to ground forces is one group of tactical air per Inf Div giving one wing per Army Corps of three Inf Div's.

6. ACTION RECOMMENDED: Acceptance of conclusions reached in Par 5, above, and that vigorous steps be taken to insure continuous and thorough joint air-ground training in all echelons of Field Armies and Tactical Air Forces.

ANNEX "A"

DISCUSSION

1. It is axiomatic that any weapon of war is best suited for the purpose for which it has been produced. Obviously, anti-tank weapons are better suited for tank destruction than for any other targets. Similarly, planes constructed for the mission of gaining air superiority have certain organic characteristics that render them superior to other planes in maneuverability and/or speed. It is unreasonable to expect that aircraft designed for fighter missions can be employed as efficiently in tactical air support as aircraft designed for tactical air support.

2. In Korea the principal aircraft employed in close support included the Navy Ad-3, F4U5, F9F3, and the Air Force F51D, F80C, F82G, B-26B. A comparison of the radii of action of Navy and Air Force planes indicates slight advantages by those of the Air Force. However, in Korea these have been offset by the ability of carrier bases to move along the coast to general areas where desired. The AD and F4U can carry a considerably heavier bomb load than their Air Force counterparts, the B-26 and the F51. Final determination as to the type best suited for a close support role, of course, should be determined by experts. No such determination would be proper, however, without ascertaining the relative enthusiasm of the supported infantry units for each type of supporting aircraft, for the real test of any weapon is the satisfaction of the man whom it is intended to assist. Most certainly, the type of close support aircraft cannot be based on the presence or absence of enemy air. Close air support must continue, uninterrupted, by planes designed for that mission. Air defense and air superiority, should be the mission of other aircraft. Basically, any military unit performs its primary mission more efficiently than lower priority missions.

3. Many years ago the Army found that success in ground battle depended upon effective and efficient teamwork by all components of the combat arms - Infantry, Artillery, Armor, Engineers, Signal, etc. Combined training by Infantry - Tank and Infantry - Artillery teams proved to be the key to later successes on the battlefield. Specifically, in current Korean operations, the efficiency displayed by the 1st Marine Division in employment of its close air support, resulting primarily through intensive pre-combat training in this respect, can well be noted by personnel responsible for planning the training of Army combat elements and Air Force tactical air units. The FEAF ALO with X Corps, obviously impressed by the close air support rendered X Corps by Marine Air units, stated the following in his official reports:

"Team work displayed by the various team members (Marine Division elements and 1st MAW) was impressive. The pilots of the support aircraft were particularly impressive by their very obvious understanding of ground problems and by the speed, accuracy and efficiency of their supporting action." It is apparent that observers and directors on the ground must know the capabilities and limitations of the air. Similarly, the air crews should be familiar with the problems and procedures of ground troops. They should have the sympathetic mutual understanding that fosters teamwork. There is no substitute for joint training - using the same supported and supporting units. This applies equally as much to air-ground training as to the all-important Infantry - Tank and Infantry - Artillery combined training.

4. One of the major factors contributing to the success of Marine air-ground operations has been the inclusion of Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP's) as organic units in the normal Battalion Combat Teams. Combat experience by X Corps in amphibious operations, operations on extended fronts, defensive operations to include withdrawals over considerable distances, conclusively prove that the Marine concept in this respect is the only assurance that air-ground operations will function effectively and efficiently. Basic functions of TACP's include the direction of offensive air support aircraft to targets in the vicinity of friendly positions, the reporting of observed results of air strikes, and the timely provision of advice to immediate ground commanders on matters pertaining to tactical operations. These basic functions cannot be effectively accomplished if the TACP's are located several miles in rear of the front lines - particularly when units operate over extended frontages in rugged terrain as encountered in Korea. Although on occasions Air Force planes have rendered extremely close support to Army ground elements, it is more common for the Marine Air to operate on targets extremely close to friendly troops. At battalion headquarters there are representatives of supporting artillery and Naval gunfire. To complete the team one TACP is needed. Then, and only then, can the commander most concerned - The Infantry Battalion Commander - be assured of realizing full support of all weapons needed to accomplish missions assigned. In essence, teamwork is achieved by delegating control to the lowest ground unit possible and allowing the same artillery, tank and air units to work with their particular ground unit team-mates. Definitely, modern warfare, over extended frontage, dictates the employment of one TACP per Infantry Battalion and higher unit, with Infantry Company observers within each Infantry Battalion.

5. Unity of command is a cardinal principle in successful combat operations. However, the Army commander in combat zones must, under the present system, depend upon "cooperation" to obtain vital tactical air support. The ground commander is responsible for that portion of the war on land, however, he lacks authority over air support elements that obviously exert decisive measures upon his own land operations. Utilization of tactical air must be closely integrated into the plans promulgated by Army commanders; therefore, the responsible ground commander must be able to direct, not ask for, the air support required. The only assurance a senior ground commander can have that any supporting arm will be employed effectively, or at all, is by having operational control over that supporting arm.

6. The number of close air support missions required daily naturally varies as much as the number of fire missions for the various supporting ground weapons. In supporting artillery, for instance, long experience has proven that one light battalion per Infantry Regiment and one medium battalion per Infantry Division, backed up as needed by additional Corps and Army artillery units, is the proper organization. X Corps experience in Korea indicates that the minimum organization for close support aircraft should be at least one tactical air squadron (24 planes) and preferably one tactical air group per Infantry Division. On this framework, as in the case of supporting artillery, additional tactical air support elements could be added. Considering that approximately eighteen planes in a squadron of twenty-four are operational at any one time, this organization will provide at least minimum constant air cover and armed reconnaissance in a division sector plus the capability of increasing the number of sorties in any desired area of attack. The group organization per division is preferable, not only for

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

accomplishing the desired strike capabilities, but for providing necessary photo reconnaissance planes and laboratory facilities, mosquito aircraft for TACP's, and helicopters for command and rescue missions. Further experience in Korea has indicated the necessity for utilization of reconnaissance airplanes for visual reconnaissance--not fighter planes. An air support organization as outlined above would create the proper emphasis on tactical air support as contrasted to the excessive subordination in recent years to the point that tactical air support was practically non-existent immediately prior to the Korean war.

7. While communication to a joint operations center is an Army responsibility, the distances between units in Korea -- particularly between X Corps and Eighth Army -- have precluded even proper command channel communication. With the JOC established near Eighth Army -- varying between 100 and 200 miles across enemy held territory -- obviously, liaison and communications between X Corps and the JOC were practically non-existent. The time lag in radio messages, after planned air missions had been completed by X Corps based upon the latest enemy information, precluded in many cases any effective close support, at the desired time and place, by Fifth Air Force. The following is quoted from FEAF WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE ROUNDUP, No. 14, from 0001/I Dec 50 to 2400/I 9 Dec 50. "The 1st Marine Air Wing operates on a letter mission directive from Fifth Air Force which is supplemented by daily operations orders. The X Corps is authorized to submit requests direct to the 1st Marine Air Wing. In event X Corps requirements exceed 1st Marine Air Wing capabilities, they are passed to headquarters, Fifth Air Force" for necessary action. "FEAF Bomber Command is available for requests for air strikes which are beyond the capabilities of Fifth Air Force."

8. Experience in Korea has indicated two outstanding profitable uses for bomber aircraft in support of ground troops. Obviously, such utilization of bombers must be carefully considered in light of the strategic bombing plan. However, at WARGWAN, on 16 Aug 50, B-29's dropped 960 tons of bombs prior to a limited attack by Eighth Army. The NK forces withdrew across the NAKTONG River, enemy artillery fire from this area ceased, and in addition the morale of our troops was raised and certainly the bombing had a definite psychological effect on the enemy. General Walker, CO Eighth Army officially commented that these strikes were of definite psychological advantage but they could be of more value if followed up immediately by ground assault into and through the bombed area. This, then, provides one example of valuable utilization of bombers in a tactical role -- that of providing "saturation" bombing on a well dug-in enemy immediately prior to our attacks. The other profitable use of bombers in a tactical role concerns support while on the defense. Early in the Korean war bombers were effectively used on "saturation" efforts to break up NK troop concentrations immediately prior to an enemy offensive. In addition, bombers were again profitably used to protect Eighth Army's open left flank SW of the NAKTONG River.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

A General Review
of
United States Tactical Air Support
in Korea

28 June 1950 _____ 8 September 1950

Contents

Forward

Section I Narrative of the Operation Showing the Development of Tactical Air Support in Korea

Section II Analysis of the Air-Ground Operations System

- a. Analysis of the Air Force-Army Organization and How it Works
- b. Analysis of the Marine Organization and How it Works
- c. Comparison of a. and b.

Section III Type Planes in Use in Korea for Tactical Air Support

- a. Air Force
- b. Navy (including Marine)
- c. Comparison of a. and b.

Section IV Conclusions

* * * * *

Forward

This review was prepared at the direction of the Chief of Staff General Headquarters United Nations Command. It is based on the daily Operations Report of the Far East Command, daily Air Action compilations prepared by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group General Headquarters Far East Command, certain technical and historical information obtained from Headquarters Far East Air Forces and Headquarters Naval Forces Far East, and material obtained from the Eighth United States Army and Fifth Air Force during a staff visit to Korea.

SECTION I

Development of Tactical Air Support in Korea

A. The ADCOM Period (28 June - 4 July).

On the morning of 25 June, the North Korean Army launched its surprise attack across the 38th parallel. On 27 June, the President of the United States authorized CINCFE to employ his available air and naval forces to lend cover and support to the Republic of Korea. Early on the morning of 28 June the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) launched its first fighter sweeps and bomber sorties of the war.

At this time the Fifth Air Force based in the Japanese Islands consisted primarily of three fighter groups (49th, 35th, and 8th) all equipped with F-80's and one B-26 group. Later in the war an additional fighter group of F-80's (the 18th) was moved up to Japan from Clark Field in the Philippines.

On the 28th of June, Major General J. H. Church with a small staff set up a GHQ Advance Command Post (ADCOM) at SUWON, 20 miles south of SEOUL.

172 combat sorties were flown by the Fifth Air Force on 29 June in support of the ROK Army, some missions being as far north as PYONGYONG. It was early apparent that the limited time over target available to the F-80 type fighter planes, after the long flight from Japanese bases, was a severe limitation of our initial tactical air effort. Additional time over target was permitted by the makeshift design of larger wing-tip tanks and hasty manufacture of these tanks in large quantities by commercial firms in Japan. In spite of this expediency the F-51 was considered to be more desirable in close support work in the Korean Operation. This fact was further pointed up by the lack of effective air opposition which permitted the slower F-51 greater freedom of movement.

Approximately 50 F-51's were hurriedly pulled out of storage early in the operation. 145 additional F-51's arrived in Japan on the 23d of July on the aircraft carrier BOXER. This permitted FEAF to convert three fighter groups from F-80 type aircraft to the F-51, leaving only the 49th Group equipped with F-80's.

On 1 July ADCOM moved to TAEJON in the face of the rapid enemy advance. By 3 July one battalion of the 21st Infantry (24th Division) had been air transported to Korea and had moved north from TAEJON. Arriving by air lift at the same time were two Fifth Air Force Tactical Air control Parties (TACP's). Also arriving on the 3d was an L-5 plane which was immediately put into use as a spotter aircraft. During this period the complete disruption of the ROK Army's lines of communication and the headlong advance of the North Korean columns had created an extremely fluid situation, both north and south of the HAN River, making close support of the ROK Army a difficult task for the Air Force. The primary sources of information determining the location of friendly units were reports from KMAG (Korean Military Advisory Group) detachments with the ROK units who would phone in location of the ROK elements as best they could.

On the 3d of July Vice Admiral Struble, Commander of the Seventh Fleet

launched the first Navy air strike at the enemy with planes from the Essex-class carrier VALLEY FORGE. These initial Navy air efforts were not in close support but air strikes at pre-selected targets and armed reconnaissance over enemy rear areas.

B. The USAFIK period (4 July - 12 July).

On 4 July, CINCFE issued orders establishing the United States Armed Forces in Korea with Major General William Dean (CG, 24th Division) as Commanding General. General Dean established his CP in TAEJON with the ADCOM staff working closely with him to effect liaison for General Headquarters. Major General Earle E. Partridge, CG, Fifth Air Force, set up a small emergency JOC also in TAEJON by flying in personnel and equipment. One TACP was sent to work with the ROK Second Corps on the right of the 24th Division which was beginning to concentrate in the TAEJON area.

On 6 July the first AT-6 plane was flown to TAEJON Airfield to be used as a target spotter for tactical air. As the 24th Division concentrated in the CHONAN-CHOCHIWAN area, additional TACP's and air force communications equipment, and personnel for the JOC were moved in. As additional regiments of the 24th Division came into action TACP's were placed with each regiment.

Commencing on the 9th of July, it was CINCFE's decision to employ a portion of the medium bomber effort on battle area targets to aid in stopping the overwhelming rush of the North Koreans. This effort was directed primarily against key highway and railroad bridges, communication centers and marshalling yards and towns close up to the battle line, and suspected troop and equipment concentrations. TABs A, B, C, and D illustrate the employment of medium bombers in this respect.

During this period intensive work was carried on by Fifth Air Force Engineers at the South Korean airfields at TAEJON, TAEGU, POHANG, and PUSAN to prepare them for fighter and administrative plane operations. F-51's and in some cases F-80's started using these airfields as refueling stops at an early date and later, several squadrons of F-51's were based in the beachhead.

C. The Eighth Army Period (12 July - 8 September 1950).

On 12 July Lt. General Walton H. Walker established the CP of the Eighth United States Army at TAEGU and took command of all United States Army forces in Korea. Fifth Air Force pulled its JOC back to TAEGU and established it as well as its forward CP in close proximity to that of General Walker's and from this date on the air-ground operations system began to take on a more recognizable resemblance of organization.

The 24th Division, the only unit in contact at that time had two TACP's. The ROK I Corps had one TACP. Two T-6's and three L-17's were available flying from the TAEJON Airfield as air control planes. From this point on, Fifth Air Force sought to meet the needs of the ground troops for TACP's as additional units of the 25th Division, 1st Cavalry Division and ultimately the 2d Division were moved into the constricting beachhead.

On 16 August, at CINCFE's direction, a maximum B-29 effort (98 planes) conducted saturation bombing of a 3 by 7 mile area along the NAKTONG River to the immediate front of the 1st Cavalry and ROK 1st Division defending the approaches to TAEGU. At this time these forces were under heavy pressure from a superior enemy concentration consisting of the North Korean 1st, 2d, 13th, and 15th Infantry Divisions and 105th Mechanized Brigade. The fall of TAEGU appeared imminent. TAB H, a report submitted by CG Eighth Army gives his estimate of the effectiveness of this effort. It is significant to note that artillery fire and enemy pressure from this area lessened considerably in the days immediately following the bombardment and that TAEGU did not fall into enemy hands.

In the latter part of August the JOC and the Tactical Air Control Center of the Fifth Air Force was moved from TAEGU to PUSAN as well as a large amount of the heavy equipment of the Eighth Army Headquarters in order to prevent disruption of vital communications or possible loss to the enemy.

An illustration of the employment of the available air to the Far East Command, seven air action reports are attached showing day's results and next day's planned missions:

1. TAB A illustrates particularly close-in use of medium bombers to affect the battle area.
2. TAB B illustrates close-in medium bomber support and also employment of carrier-based planes.
3. TAB C illustrates use of medium bombers in protecting the open left flank of the Eighth Army.
4. TAB D illustrates close-in medium bomber effort during a period of rapid and sustained North Korean advance.
5. TAB E illustrates maximum effort of all available medium bombers (98) in saturation effort on a suspected concentration of 40,000 North Korean troops, to assist in breaking up heavy enemy offensive.
6. TAB F illustrates heavy fighter effort by both FEAF and Navy air.
7. TAB G illustrates normal effort by FEAF aircraft and Marine fighters from escort carriers.
8. TAB H, General Walker's comments on maximum bomb effort in WAEGWAN area.
9. TAB I is a report on use of medium bombers showing percentage of mission-ready aircraft used in battle area.
10. TAB J, FEAF report on first month's operations of Bomber Command.

SECTION II

Analysis of the Air-Ground Operations System

A. Air Force - Army.

1. TACP's.

As of 23 August the disposition of TACP's were as shown on the attached TAB K, the standard breakdown of TACP's being one to each United States regiment and United States division headquarters and one to each ROK division and corps headquarters. In the case of the 25th ROK regiment as shown on the chart, TAB K, its isolated position required that a TAC be furnished it. The forward air controllers (FAC's) with the TACP's are rated pilots with an average of at least 40 missions in the Korean fighting. The organization of the TACP's being used by the Fifth Air Force instead of being four in personnel strength are three, namely, the FAC, radio operator and radio repairman, the latter doubling as a jeep driver. This was necessary in order to meet the acute personnel shortage existing throughout all elements in the FEC.

2. Air TACP's (Controller planes).

The standard assignment of Air TACP's is as shown on the chart, TAB K, the standard assignment being one to each United States division area and one to each ROK Corps area. In the case of the ROK division on the extreme right as shown on the chart, an Air TACP was furnished because of its isolated position. As of 23 August, Fifth Air Force had a total of 29 T-6's operational in Korea, all using the TAEGU airstrip. These planes man the six stations shown on TAB K. The tour lasts from dawn until dusk, each plane standing a two-hour period, being relieved on station. The lighter type L-planes are not used in this work due to the availability of the T-6 aircraft which have higher performance figures and are favored over the lighter planes by the Fifth Air Force. The absence of effective enemy air opposition and enemy anti-aircraft elements permits these spotting aircraft to make relatively deep penetrations into the rear of the enemy battle area and to make bold, low flights in their mission of picking up tactical air targets. However, the use of the T-6's for air control purposes does not prevent the L-type planes of the ground divisions from also picking up possible air targets.

3. Joint Operations Center (JOC).

The Joint Operations Center now located at PUSAN is on the second floor of the Fifth Air Force Headquarters Building approximately one mile from Eighth Army Headquarters. It is adequately manned by Air Force and G-3 Air personnel but is short G-2 Air personnel, photo interpretation teams, the Signal Company (air-ground liaison), and the photo reproduction team. Steps have been taken to fill these shortages. The Signal Company (air-ground liaison) is under orders from the ZI at this time, additional G-2 Air personnel will be forthcoming shortly, photo interpretation teams have been requested to be air-lifted from the ZI and FEAF is taking steps to secure a photo reproduction team for the JOC.

4. Ground Liaison Officers (GLO's).

At the time of staff visit the Eighth Army Ground Liaison Officers were still lacking at several of the FEAF fighter and reconnaissance bases. Eighth Army is in the process of training and sending GLO's to all needed positions. This should be up to standard shortly.

5. Air Liaison Officers (ALO's).

At the present time there are experienced ALO's from Fifth Air Force at each United States division headquarters and at the two ROK Corps headquarters.

6. Analysis of Effect of Existing Shortages on Present Operations.

At the present time the maximum effective employment of available tactical air is being handicapped by the lack of personnel and equipment as follows:

a. Signal Company (AGL).

The lack of this unit prevents the establishment of the G-2 and G-3 air nets, the clear-voice reconnaissance net and the GLO net. At the present time command channels are used to carry this communication on which overloads existing facilities and slows down to some extent the operation of the Air-ground system.

b. Photo interpretation teams.

Lack of these at the JOC as well as the corps and division headquarters causes many profitable air targets to be missed completely or else located too late for effective attack.

c. Photo reproduction team.

The lack of this unit at the JOC causes the loss of time created by having to develop reconnaissance flight prints at Itazuke Air Force Base at Kyushu (Japan) and flown back to the JOC.

d. Tactical Air Direction Centers. (TADC's).

The absence of these installations in the Air Force Tactical Air Control system causes some loss of control of tactical air. The almost complete lack of enemy air makes this absence felt little in regard to warning of enemy air. FEAF has taken steps to get this equipment and necessary technical personnel to the theater.

When all of the above deficiencies are erased, the effectiveness of tactical air support will increase correspondingly. However, the lack of this equipment and personnel has not prevented maximum employment of the available air support.

7. Method of Employment of Close Support Air.

Planes take off from bases on pre-planned or call missions and report.

in to Fifth Air Force Tactical Air Control Center at PUSAN. Control assigns planes to one of the United States divisions sectors or one of the ROK corps sectors. Planes proceed to that sector and report in to the Air TACP who guides them in on appropriate target. The bulk of the missions being flown at the present time are not pre-planned, being assigned to the plane after arrival over the division sector.

B. Analysis of Marine Tactical Air Employment. (The First Provisional Marine Brigade entered action on 6 August with attached supporting air consisting of two squadrons of F4U's of 24 planes each, based on the escort carriers BADOENG STRAITS and SICILY affording an opportunity for comparison with Air Force methods).

1. Command.

The planes supporting the Marines are not in support but are actually attached to the First Provisional Marine Brigade and therefore, operate under the Brigade Commander's direct control.

2. Training.

The pilots of the two squadrons have been a part of the Brigade for an average of two years service with the unit and besides being trained in air-ground technique have also had ground training with it. This familiarity with ground tactics as well as the personal relationships which have grown up between the airmen and ground personnel provides a close feeling of confidence and understanding between the two.

3. TACP's and Air TACP's.

Assignment of TACP's are as shown on TAB L, one to each battalion and one acting as control at the Brigade Headquarters. One F4U flies air spotting mission during daylight hours.

4. Method of Employment.

When the Marine Brigade is operating in the line, planes take off from the carriers on pre-planned or call missions and report in to control at Brigade Headquarters, Control assigns the planes to a particular battalion area, the spotter aircraft guides the plane in on the target with assistance from the ground TACP. When the Brigade is not operating, the Marine air may be made available to Fifth Air Force in which case the two squadrons are attached to Fifth Air Force for operational control and planes report in to control at PUSAN for onward routing as do other Fifth Air Force tactical Air.

C. Comparison of Fifth Air Force and Marine Tactical Air Support.

Certain salient features of differences stand out between the Marine and Air Force operations as follows:

1. Proximity of Support Rendered by Marine Air.

Although on occasions Air Force planes have rendered extremely close

support to Army ground elements, it is more common for the Marine Air to operate on targets extremely close to friendly troops. This is made possible by the greater number of TACP's in the Marine organization as well as the close familiarity and understanding existing between personnel on the ground and in the air. This same confidence and understanding can be built up in an Army organization with a veteran tactical Air Force unit but it is pertinent to point out that this confidence and understanding existed in the Marine unit from the time of its initial entry into combat due to its intensive prior training in this field.

2. All-out Effort of Marine Air for Close Support.

All of the Marine Air strength is devoted to the mission of close support. That is its sole job when the Brigade is operating. The added missions that are of necessity assigned to the Fifth Air Force, i. e. maintaining air superiority, air-field sweeps, reconnaissance, and battlefield isolation, can and do cause a diminution of the tactical air support available to a given Army unit at certain periods of time. In short, it could probably be stated that the Marine Air Support, barring the exigencies of weather, can be counted on as reliably as its own artillery.

3. Better Type of Close Support Aircraft in Use by the Marines.

Regardless of the pros and cons that can be offered, there is no denying the fact that the F4U can deliver a considerably larger armament load to a given spot than either the F-80 or the F-51 with an equivalent degree of accuracy which renders it, plane for plane, in operations such as now are going on in Korea, the superior type close-support aircraft. Armament and performance figures on all planes used in tactical air support in the Korean fighting are discussed in detail in Section III.

SECTION III

Type Planes in Use in Korea for Tactical Air Support

A. Air Force Planes (Performance figures are approximate).

	Radius of Action (N M)	Guns 50 Cal	Bombs (lbs)	Rockets (5 Inch)	Speeds	
					Cruise	Combat
B-26B	590	16	6000	14	190	324
B-26B (with external tanks)	860	16	4000	--	200	324
F51D	400	6	2000	10	220	---
F51D (with external tanks)	760	6	----	--	220	350
F80C	125	6	2000	8	---	---
F80C (with external tanks)	550	6	----	4	350	400
F82G	339	6	----	20	---	---
F82G (with external tanks)	800	6	----	16	235	340

B. Navy (Marine) Planes.

AD-3	275	2	9000	14	---	285
AD-3 (with external tanks)	730	2	----	--	---	318
F4U5 (with external tanks)	335	4	5200	10	---	372
F9F3	445	4	none	6	---	466
F9F3 (with external tanks)	652	4	none	6	---	464

C. Comparison of Air Force and Navy Planes.

1. Radius of Action.

The carrier planes are favored in this category by the ability of the carrier bases to move along the coast of Korea to the general area in which it is desired to make air strikes.

2. Armament.

The AD and F4U can carry a considerably heavier bomb load than their Air Force counterparts, the B-26 and the F-51. The rocket capacity is fairly even and the relative effect of 20mm as compared to .50 cal in strafing attacks in open to discussion.

SECTION IV

Conclusions

A. Special Conditions Existing in the Korean Operation.

Prior to analysis of the conclusions reached in this review, the special conditions existing in the Korean operation must be carefully considered and weighed. These special conditions are:

1. The absence of effective enemy air.
2. The weakness of effective enemy anti-aircraft elements.
3. The long distances tactical air had to fly to reach target areas in the initial phases of the campaign. This applies to Air Force tactical air only.
4. The extremely rugged terrain making up the vast bulk of land area of Korea which rendered extremely hazardous the making of low passes at ground targets particularly for the jet aircraft with their higher rates of speed.

B. Conclusions.

1. General Tactical Air Support.

The tactical air support rendered by the Fifth Air Force, the Carrier Division of the Seventh Fleet and the Marine Air elements is considered to have been to the maximum of these units ability consistent with certain shortages in equipment and personnel. When these shortages are filled, the efficiency will increase accordingly.

2. Most Effective Type Close-support Planes.

It is commonly accepted that in the Korean operation the F-51 is favored over the F-80 and the F4U and AD over the F9F as close support planes. The deciding reasons are greater armament capacity, greater time over target ability and slower diving speeds.

3. Use of Medium Bombers for Close Support.

In this respect the overriding principle is considered to be that regardless of the normally accepted usage of a particular weapon it must have the flexibility for any use in an emergency as desired by the Commander. The use of medium bombers in the close-in interdiction program as well as the unparalleled mass bombing at WAEGWAN as a defense measure is considered sound and as playing a major part in the slowing and blunting the all-out enemy assault against the beachhead.

4. Air TACP's (spotter aircraft).

The use of Air TACP's in large numbers is extremely profitable under

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

conditions now found in the Korean fighting. The lack of effective enemy anti-aircraft and air opposition permits deep penetration into the enemy's battle areas and bold, low flights in the locating of profitable air targets.

5. Need for Pre-combat Training in Close-support Work for Both Army and Air Force.

The efficiency displayed by the 1st Marine Brigade from the time of its initial entry into action in employment of its close support air caused primarily by intensive pre-combat training in this respect can well be noted by personnel responsible for planning the training of Army combat elements and Air Force tactical air units.


13 Inclosures

 Tabs A to M

 Operations Reports

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED



TAB A

016300-12-
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RESULTS OF FEAF OPERATIONS 27000IK - 2724K.

1. Fighters: 58 F-80 and 42 F-51 sorties were flown. Preliminary mission reports indicate the following were destroyed: 19 trucks, 3 ammo carts, 9 other vehicles, ammunition or fuel dump at YONGSON and 1 gun position at YONGHAE. The following were reported as damaged: 3 tanks, 16 trucks, 5 RR cars, and an unknown number of tank cars and flat cars at UMSONG, and a road bridge at YONGGANNI.
2. Bombers: 22 B-29 sorties were flown. Preliminary mission reports indicate the following results:
 - a. 6 B-29s (19th Bomb GP) bombed RR bridge at SEOUL $37^{\circ} 37'N-127^{\circ} 05'E$, reporting that the upper part of the bridge was destroyed and deemed that no further attacks were necessary.
 - b. 8 B-29s (22d Bom Gp) bombed the following targets with results as noted:
 - (1) RR bridge at $35^{\circ} 51'N-127^{\circ} 07'E$ received direct hits on center. The middle span (8 spans) was reported to be lying in river and on highway bridge. Tracks on either side of RR bridge knocked out.
 - (2) Hwy bridge at $35^{\circ} 54'N-126^{\circ} 56'E$ was hit 4 times with N span evidently sagging and adjacent spans warped. 1 span north of west bridge unpassable.
 - (3) Hwy bridge $36^{\circ} 25'N-127^{\circ} 18'E$ was bombed. No damage reported.
 - (4) RR bridge at $36^{\circ} 27'N-127^{\circ} 25'E$ may have been weakened by near misses of bombs which straddled bridge.
 - (5) Hwy bridge $36^{\circ} 24'N-127^{\circ} 15'E$ received superficial damage.
 - (6) RR bridge $36^{\circ} 27'N-127^{\circ} 26'E$; no damage was reported however bridge previously hit.
 - (7) Marshalling yard $37^{\circ} 53'N-127^{\circ} 43'E$. Target burned out before bomb strike. 10 bombs fell on buildings in yard.
 - (8) Military installation $37^{\circ} 42'N-127^{\circ} 43'E$. All bombs over target area; meager damage.
 - (9) Hwy bridge $36^{\circ} 20'N-127^{\circ} 14'E$ was destroyed.
 - (10) RR bridge and Hwy bridge $36^{\circ} 37'N-127^{\circ} 21'E$ was bombed but damage unknown.
 - (11) Hwy bridge $36^{\circ} 36'N-127^{\circ} 18'E$ was bombed with damage unknown.
 - (12) Hwy bridge $36^{\circ} 27'N-127^{\circ} 07'E$ was bombed. Damage unknown.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

(13) RR bridge 36°18'N-127°23'E. South side of bridge damaged. Tracks knocked out.

(14) TAEJON marshalling yards were bombed. Bomb strike caused explosion in warehouse.

c. 8 B-29s (92d Bom GP) bombed the following targets with results as noted:

(1) 2 RR bridges at 39°53'N-127°32'E direct hit on bridge. Believed knocked out.



(2) Hwy bridge 39°54'N-127°31'E direct hit on bridge. Believed knocked out.

(3) Marshalling yards at 39°09'N-127°26'E. Excellent results. Bombs fell across roundhouse and center of marshalling yards.

(4) Hwy bridge 39°00'N-125°46'E. Direct hits across bridge. Damage unknown.

(5) RR bridge at 39°40'N-125°34'E. Direct hit. Hole observed but bridge intact.

* * * * *

PLANNED FEAF OPERATIONS
28 July 1950

1. FEAF BOMBER COMD (B-29s) will:

A. Primary vis:

(1) With 1 gp, atk fol tgts:

- (a) Hwy br, Yusong, 36 21'-127 21'
 (b) Hwy br, 3 mi SSW Chochiwon, 36 34'-127 15'
 (c) Hwy br, Togye-Ri, 36°30'-127°12'
 (d) Hwy br, 4 mi N Kongju, 36°31'-127°07'
 (e) Two hwy br's, Kongju, 36°28'-127°07'
 (f) Hwy br's, 1/2 mi NW Tongai-Ri, 36°28'-127°03'
 (g) Hwy br, Chukch'On-Ni, 36°36'-126°51'
 (h) Hwy br, 2 mi S Anyo-Ri, 37°22'-126°56'
 (i) Hwy br, Osan, 37°09'-127°04'
 (j) Hwy br, Osan, 37°09'-127°03'
 (k) Two Hwy br's, Chongju, 36°37'-127°29'
 (l) Hwy br, Pyongdong-Ni, 37°08'-128°01'
 (m) Two Hwy br's, Umsong, 36°56'-127°41'
 (n) Hwy br, 4 mi W Munan-Ni, 36°48'-127°37'
 (o) RR and Hwy br, 2 mi W Wont'Ont-Ni, 36°43'-127°32'
 (p) Hwy br, 3 mi N Wonju, 37°22'-127°57'
 (q) RR br, 6 mi SE Wonju, 37°16'-128°01'

- (r) RR br, 1 mi N Tanyang, 36° 57' -128° 19'
- (s) RJ, Mokkye, 37° 05' -127° 52'
- (t) RJ, Ungye-Ri, 37° 11' -127° 53'

(2) With 1 Gp:

- (a) Atk W br, of triple br complex at Seoul.
- (b) Alternate: Tgts listed in Par 1A(3) below.

(3) With 1 Gp: Ark tgts listed in Par 1B, or 0.0. 28-50 for 27 Jul 50, plus the fol:

(a) Priority 1:

1. RR br, Tgt No. 6 SK, 37° 53' -126° 44'
2. RR br, Tgt No. 5 SK, 37° 55' -127° 04'
3. Hwy br, Tgt No. 11 SK, 37° 51' -127° 03'
4. Hwy br, Tgt No. 12 SK, 37° 55' -127° 13'
5. Hwy br, Tgt No. 13 SK, 37° 52' -127° 41'
6. Hwy br, Tgt No. 124 SK, 37° 33' -127° 19'
7. RR br, Tgt No. 85 SK, 37° 33' -127° 19'
8. Hwy br, Tgt No. 165 SK, 37° 24' -127° 15'
9. Hwy br, Tgt No. 16 SK, 37° 23' -128° 24'

(b) Priority 2:

1. Hwy br, Tgt No. 118 SK, 37° 57' -126° 40'
2. RR br, Tgt No. 7 SK, 37° 55' -126° 40'
3. Hwy br, Tgt No. 14 SK, 37° 41' -127° 53'
4. Hwy br, Tgt No. 167 SK, 37° 07' -127° 38'
5. RR br, Tgt No. 175 SK, 37° 21' -127° 57'

B. Last resort: As selected by CG FEAFF Bom Comd

C. Conduct rcn as fol:

(1) Priority 1: Most urgent, all rcn required by FEAFF AX 2604, to be accomp by fly 1 night and 1 day mission in ea 2 day pd.

(2) Priority 2: Conduct tri-met photo as required by FEAFF AX 3256.

(3) Priority 3: Photo coverage of all en adrms N of Line 3900-12513 to 4000-12730, thence E to Coast at least once ea 2 days.

(4) Priority 4: Mapping required by FEAFF MF 5697.

(5) Priority 5: Photo rcn required by FEAFF MF 5698.


CINCFE DIRECTED STRIKES

CINCFE msg CX 58759 directed FEAFF to center sustained medium bomber effort on critical area as outlined in purple.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. Fifth AF will: (F-80s, F-51s, F-82s & B-29s)
 - A. Destroy and keep out of comm pontoon br vicinity SEOUL triple br complex.
 - B. Bbr. Conduct bomb missions under dir or grd controller or as required by curr int.
 - C. Ftr: Maint air superiority, perform interdiction, close spt, escort and air cover as required.
 - D. Tax rcn:
 - (1) Priority 1: Daily vis rcn w/photo verification to determine en str, composition, and dir of mv within the imm battle area and S of 38 deg.
 - (2) Priority 2: Daily photo coverage of all en adrms S of line fr 39°00'-125°13' to 40°00'-127°30' thence to E coast.
 - (3) Priority 3: Post strike photo as required.
 - E. Rescue:: SAR as required.
3. 2143d AWW: Conduct wea rcn.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED



TAB B

RESULTS OF OPERATIONS 280001K to 282400K

1. **Fighters:** Fighter operations consisted of 59 F-80s, 41 F-51s (8 Mustangs of 77th Squadron included), and 2 F-82s sorties were flown in ground support armed reconnaissance and weather reconnaissance missions. Preliminary mission reports indicate that the following were destroyed: 1 tank, 10 trucks, 1 bus, 8 misc vehicles, 1 locomotive, 12 RR cars, 1 warehouse, 2 artillery pieces, 3 bldgs, and an electric plant at SUNCHON. The following were reported as damaged: 1 tank, 7 trucks, 2 misc vehicles, 15 RR cars, a power plant at Nonsan, Mokpo marshalling yards, RR stations at Nonsan and Kangyong, and a small ammo dump at Yongdong. 2 villages north of Yechon were strafed.

2. **Bombers:**

a. B-26. 18 sorties were flown on bombing, strafing, and night intruder missions. B-26s damaged a RR bridge at 37° 17'N-127° 18'E and a RR station 35° 16'N-127° 18'E, a RR station at Taejon, and RR yard, tunnel and rolling stock at town of Kari.

b. B-29s

(1) 8 B-29s (92 Bomb Gp) bombed marshalling yards at Pyongyang 39° 0'N-125° 44'E, numerous secondary explosions observed as results of bombs dropped, fires started. East river RR bridge Pyongyang received 2 direct hits for excellent results, RR bridge at Yangsu-ri 37° 32'N-127° 19'E received direct hit on approach.

(2) 6 B-29s (19th Bomb Gp) bombed bridge at Seoul and Pyongyang, no visible damage but good bomb pattern. This Bomb Gp reported Seoul bridge still standing and several other bridges crossing river north and east of Seoul in good condition.

(3) 8 B-29s (22 Bomb Gp) bombed the following bridges with results as noted.

- a. RR bridge 35° 57'N-126° 50'E minor damage.
- b. Hwy bridge 36° 28'N-127° 3'E, no damage.
- c. Hwy bridge 36° 26'N-127° 4'E, minor damage.
- d. Hwy bridge 36° 30'N-127° 1'E, damage by 2 hits, not destroyed.
- e. Hwy bridge 36° 38'N-127° 21'E, one span at north end toppled by direct hit.
- f. RR bridge at 36° 43'N-127° 32'E, first run knocked hole in bridge, south span of bridge destroyed.

* * * * *

NAVY (CARRIER) STRIKE RESULTS 28 July 1950

The following Carrier Aircraft strikes were reported with results as noted:

- ◇ 1. 5 large fires were started, 4 trucks destroyed, 7 trucks damaged, and 4 buses were strafed in Namwon.
- 2. At Kangjin 3 trucks were burned, 4 trucks damaged and town was strafed.
- 3. Destroyed 3 trucks N.E. Pyongyang. In same area 5 napalm bombs were lobbed inside tunnel where troops reportedly had taken cover.
- 4. Near Yongdong 3 villages were burned, 3 trucks were destroyed, road was blocked by landslide where houses were damaged, and a camouflaged field piece was destroyed.
- 5. Burned 3 small villages E of Longsong.
- 6. Burned 14 warehouses SW of Taejon.
- 7. Strafed and left sinking barge at Kunsan.
- 8. Set fire to 5 villages, strafed and killed about 50 troops with pack animals fording river at Hamchang.
- 9. Burned 3 warehouses at Yongammi.

* * * * *

OPERATIONS PLANNED FOR 29 Jul 50

- 1. FEAF Bomb Comd will:
 - A. With 1 Gp (B-29s), atk for tgts (Primary visual):
 - (1) Hwy br, Yusong, 36°21'-127°21'
 - (2) Hwy br, 3 mi SSW Chochiwon, 36°34'-127°15'
 - (3) Hwy br, Togyo-Ri, 36°30'-127°12'
 - (4) Hwy br, 4 mi N Kongju, 36°31'-127°07'
 - (5) Two hwy br's, Kongju, 36°28'-127°07'
 - (6) Hwy br's, 1/2 mi NW Tongai-Ri, 36°28'-127°03'
 - (7) Hwy br, Chukch'on-Ni, 36°36'-126°51'
 - (8) Hwy br, 2 mi S Anyo-Ri, 37°22'-126°56'
 - (9) Hwy br, Osan, 37°09'-127°04'
 - (10) Hwy br, Osan, 37°09'-127°03'
 - (11) Two hwy br's, Chongju, 36°37'-127°29'
 - (12) Hwy br, Pyongdong-Ni, 37°08'-128°01'
 - (13) Two hwy br's, Umsong, 36°56'-127°41'
 - (14) Hwy br, 4 mi W Munan-Ni, 36°48'-127°37'
 - (15) RR and hwy br 2 mi NW Wont'Ong-Ni, 36°43'-127°32'
 - (16) Hwy br, 3 mi N Wonju, 37°22'-127°57'
 - (17) RR br, 6 mi SE Wonju, 37°16'-128°01'
 - (18) RR br, 1 mi N Tanyang, 36°57'-128°19'

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- (19) RJ, Mokkye, $37^{\circ}05' - 127^{\circ}52'$
 (20) RJ, Ungye-Ri, $37^{\circ}11' - 127^{\circ}53'$

- B. Last resort, as selected by CG FEAF Bom Com.
 C. Two (2) Medium bomb groups designated by CG FEAF

Bomb Comd will stand down for 29 July 1950

- D. Conduct rcn as fol:

(1) Priority 1: Most urgent, all rcn required by FEAF AX 2604, to be accomp by fly 1 night and 1 day mission in ea 2 day pd.

(2) Priority 2: Conduct tri-met photo as required by FEAF AX 3256.

(3) Priority 3: Photo coverage of all en Adrms N of line $39^{\circ}00' - 125^{\circ}13'$ to $40^{\circ}00' - 127^{\circ}30'$, thence E to coast at least once ea 2 days.

(4) Priority 4: Mapping required by FEAF MF 5697.

(5) Priority 5: Photo rcn required by FEAF MF 5698.

2. 5th AF (F-80's, F-82's, F-51's, & B-26's) will:

A. Destroy and keep out of comm pontoon br vicinity Seoul triple br complex.

B. Bbr: Conduct bomb missions under dir of grd controller or as required by curr int.

C. Ftr: Main air superiority, perform interdiction, close spt, escort and air cover as required.

- D. Tac rcn:

(1) Priority 1: Daily vis rcn w/photo verification to determine en str, composition, and dir of mv within the imm battle area and S of 38 deg.

(2) Priority 2: Daily photocoverage of all en adrms S of line from $39^{\circ}00' - 125^{\circ}13'$ to $40^{\circ}00' - 127^{\circ}30'$ thence to E coast.

E. Rescue: SAR as required.

3. 2143d AWW: Conduct wea rcn.


CINCFE DIRECTED STRIKES

CINCFE message CX 58759 supplemented by CINCFE message CX 58912 directed FEAF to center medium bomber effort on critical areas as outlined in purple.

NAVY (CARRIER) OPERATIONS

7th Fleet (carriers) will remain on station prepared to conduct air operations (weather permitting) in support of ground forces.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



TAB C

RESULTS OF OPERATIONS FROM 310001K to 312400K JUL 50

A. Ftrs:

a. F-51s: 48 sorties were flown on armed rcn and grd spt missions. Preliminary mission repts indicate the fol results:

(1) At KOCHANG one bridge, one truck and 3 AA psns were destroyed. One truck, one AA psn were damaged. Acft strafed 2 br's and trps with unknown results and set fire to town and 1 village.

(2) At SUNCHON 3 boxcars and 6 small buildings were destroyed and 3 boxcars in marshalling yards were damaged.

(3) At CHINJU makeshift river crossing was destroyed.

(4) At HADONG one truck was destroyed and 1 tank, 1 truck were damaged. Acft strafed 3/400 trps with unknown results.

(5) At HWANGGANG one truck was damaged.

(6) At YECHON 3 tanks, 2 trucks, one arty piece were destroyed. One 105mm arty piece, one tank, 2 trucks, and fuel dump were damaged.

(7) At ANDONG one truck was destroyed; one tank, and one truck were damaged.

(8) At YONDONG 1 RR tunnel was destroyed and 1 40mm AA psn was possibly destroyed.

(9) At CHIRYE one gun psn and 1 armored car were destroyed. 2 trucks were damaged. Town was bombed and strafed and fires started.

(10) At YONGDOK one truck and one fuel truck were destroyed.

b. F-80s: 132 sorties were flown in grd spt and armed rcn missions.

(1) At NAMWON village was strafed.

(2) At HWANGGANG one tank, 2 trucks, and 1 staff car were damaged.

(3) At KOCHANG one oxcart was destroyed and 3 carts were damaged and 125 casualties were inflicted upon the enemy.

(4) At YECHON 5 trucks were destroyed and 2 tanks damaged.

(5) In SUNCHON area one locomotive, 16 boxcars and 1 truck were destroyed and 13 boxcars damaged.

(6) At PYONGTAEK one truck and 3 buildings were destroyed.

(7) At CHOCHIWON 10 boxcars were damaged.

(8) At CHONJU 5 buildings, 14 boxcars and 1 POL were destroyed.

(9) At YONDONG 4 boxcars and 1 truck were damaged. Gasoline stored in houses was destroyed.

B. Bombers:

a. B-26s: 23 B-26 sorties were flown on bombing and night intruder missions. Targets at SUNCHON, KUMSAN, TAEGYE-RI were bombed with unknown results. At ANYANG-NI, bridge and marshalling yards were probably damaged. At HADONG one span of bridge at 36-04N, 127-44E was knocked out. At PYONGTAEK one span of bridge at 36-58N, 127-05E was destroyed. Bridge damaged at 35-04N, 127-45E. Road damaged at 36-56N, 127-56E. 5 boxcars were damaged in the ANDONG area.

b. B-29s:

(1) 8 B-29 (19 Bomb Gp) sorties were flown, Two spans of RR bridge at 35-39N, 127-16E and one span of hwy br at 35-24N, 127-13E were destroyed. *

(2) 8 B-29 (19 Bomb Gp) sorties were flown with the fol results: 2 spans of bridge at 36-37N, 127-29E were destroyed and west approach to RR bridge damaged.

* * * * *

FEAF PLANNED OPERATIONS FOR 1 AUG 1950

1. FEAF Bom Comd will:

a. With 1 gp:

(1) First priority, visual:

- (a) Hwy br, YUSONG, 36-21N, 127-21E.
- (b) Hwy br, 3 mi SSW CHOCHIWON, 36-34N, 127-15E.
- (c) Hwy br, TOGYE-RI, 36-30N, 127-12E.
- (d) Hwy br, 4 mi N KONGJU, 36-21N, 127-07E.
- (e) Two hwy br's, KONGJU, 36-28N, 127-07E.
- (f) Hwy br's, 1/2 mi NW TONGAI-RI, 36-28N, 127-03E.
- (g) Hwy br, CHUKCH'ON-Ni, 36-36N, 126-51E.
- (h) Hwy br, 2mi S ANYO-RI, 37-22N, 126-56E.
- (i) Hwy br, OSAN, 37-09N, 127-04E.
- (j) Hwy br, OSAN, 37-09N, 127-03E.
- (k) Two hwy br's, CHONGJU, 36-37N, 127-29E.
- (l) Hwy br, PYONGDONG-NI, 37-08N, 128-01E.
- (m) Two hwy br's, UMSONG, 36-56N, 127-41E.
- (n) Hwy br, 4mi W MUNAN-NI, 36-48N, 127-37E.
- (o) RR and Hwy br, 2 mi NW WONT'ONG-NI, 36-43N, 127-32E.
- (p) Hwy br, 3 mi N WONJU, 37-22N, 127-57E.
- (q) RR br, 6 mi SEWONJU, 37-16N, 128-01E.
- (r) RR br, 1 mi N TANYANG, 36-57N, 128-19E.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- (s) RJ, MOKKYE, 37-05N, 127-52E.
- (t) RJ, UNGYE-RI, 37-11N, 127-53E.

(2) Second priority, visual:

- (a) RR and hwy br. OSU-RI, 35-32N, 127-20E.
- (b) Hwy br, 6 mi NE CHONJU, 36-52N, 127-15E.
- (c) Hwy br, 1 mi NW KOWON-NI, 35-24N, 127-13E.
- (d) RR br, 2 mi N KOKSONG, 35--8N, 127-18E.
- (e) Hwy and RR br, 5 mi NW SINWOL-LI, 35-11N, 127-22E.
- (f) Hwy br, SINWOL-LI, 35-09N, 127-27E.
- (g) Hwy br, HWAGAE-JANG, 35-11N, 127-37E.
- (h) Hwy br, HADONG, 35-03N, 127-45E.
- (i) RR and hwy br, SE SUNCHON, 34-57N, 127-29E.
- (j) Hwy br, 1 mi NW KUNG-RI, 35-36N, 127-06E.
- (k) Five hwy br's, SEDGE CHONJU, 35-49N, 127-08E.
- (l) Hwy br, 9 mi SE KUNSAN, 35-54N, 126-50E.
- (m) Two RR br's, Hwy br, 2 mi S IRI, 35-55N, 126-56E.
- (n) RR br, S SAMNYE-RI, 35-54N, 127-04E.
- (o) Hwy br, 3 mi NE KARHYON-RI, 35-52N, 127-29E.
- (p) RR and hwy br, S SONCHON-RI, 35-40N, 127-16E.
- (q) Hwy br, 1 mi SW TAEIN, 35-39N, 126-55E.
- (r) Hwy br, SW CHONGUP, 35-35N, 126-50E.
- (s) Hwy br, SW CHONGUP, 35-34N, 126-51E.
- (t) Hwy br, 1 mi SW KALTAM-NI, 35-31N, 127-09E.

b. With 2 Gps: Atk indust complex at HUNGNAM, 39-49N, 127-37E.

c. Last resort: As selected by CG, FEAF Bom Com.

d. Conduct rcn as fol:

(1) Priority 1: Most urgent, all rcn required by REAF AX 2604 to be accomp by fly 1 night and 1 day mission in each 2 day pd.

(2) Priority 2: Conduct tri-met photo as required by FEAF AX 3256.

(3) Priority 3: Photo coverage of all en adrms N of line 39-00N, 125-13E to 40-00N, 127-30E, thence E to coast at least once ea 2 days.

(4) Priority 4: Mapping required by FEAF MF 5697.

(5) Priority 5: Photo rcn required by FEAF MF 5698.

2. 5th AF will:

a. Bombers: B-26s will conduct missions under ground controller or as req by current intelligence.

b. Ftrs: Maint air superiority, perform interdiction, cover and close sup as req by cur int.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

c. Tac Rcn:

(1) Priority 1: Daily vis rcn w/photo verification to determine en str, composition and dir of mv within the imm battle area and S of 38 deg.

(2) Priority 2: Daily photo coverage of all en Adrms S of line fr 39-00N, 125-13E to 40-00N, 127-30E thence E to coast.


(3) Priority 3: Post strike photo as required.

d. Rescue: SAR asrequired.

3. 2143d AWW: Conduct wea rcn.

CINCFE DIRECTED STRIKES

CINCFE message CX 58759 supplemented by CINCFE msg CX 58912 directed FEAF to center medium bomber effort on critic l areas as outlined in purple.



TAB D

RESULTS OF OPERATIONS 010001K to 012400K AUG 1950

A. Ftrs:

1. F-51s: 117 F-51 sorties (RAAF incl- missions (25) flown 31 Jul and not previously reported) were flown on escort, grd spt, armed rcn and intruder missions. Preliminary mission reports indicate the fol results:

a. In CHINJU area, 19 trks were destroyed, 2 trks and 2 locomotives were damaged. 1 supply dump burned.

b. At HWACHON, 2 tanks and 2 trks were destroyed, and 1 tank was damaged.

c. At SUCHON, RR yard was damaged.

d. At CHUNG-JU one truck was destroyed and bridge south of town damaged.

e. At KOCHANG, 2 tanks, 3 trks, and 1 bridge were damaged.

f. At OKCHON, one bus was destroyed and 1 tk damaged.

g. At GWINWIJE, 35-11N, 128-05E, one tk and 1 large bldg were destroyed and 1 tk damaged.

h. At YONGDOK, power house was damaged.

i. At KOCHON, one bridge was damaged.

j. At HADONG, one warehouse was destroyed.

k. The fol results were reported, specific locations unknown: 2 vehs, 1 tk, 4 trks, 1 fuel trk were destroyed and 3 vehs and 1 med tk were damaged.

2. F-80's: 188 F-80 sorties were flown on armed rcn and grd spt missions, results are as fol:

a. At SONGJONG-NI, 1 tk, 4 boxcars were destroyed, and 1 supply dump damaged.

b. At ANDONG, 1 ammo dump, 2 vehs, and 2 trks were destroyed, 6 trks, 1 bldg and 3 vehs were damaged.

c. At SUWON, 1 trk and 1 fuel dump were destroyed and 2 trks and an airfield strafed.

d. Marshalling yards at 34-19N, 126-28E were destroyed.

e. The fol results were reported with indefinite locations: 2 tks, 19 trks, 1 armored car, 2 locomotives, 12 boxcars, 1 fuel dump, 3 AA psns, 2 vehs, 1 bldg, and a RR station were destroyed. 11 locomotives, 111 boxcars, 6 tank cars, 2 factories, 1 radio station, 1 power plant, 1 warehouse, 17 trks, 5 vehs, 9 boats, and 6 horse drawn vehs were damaged.

B. Bombers:

1. B-26s: 26 B-26 sorties were flown in night intruder and bombing and strafing missions. Results are as fol:

a. In SEOUL area, 3 trks, 1 bridge, and 1 tk were damaged. 1 veh repair shop was destroyed.

b. In YOJU area, 1 ammo trk and 2 vehs were destroyed.

c. In TAEJON area, hits were made on 4 hangers which are used as repair shops.

d. Marshalling yards at 37-12N, 127-03E were bombed with unknown results.

e. RJ between TAEJON and UOKU were bombed with unknown results.

f. Target at 36-36N, 127-18E was damaged in NW Section.

2. B-29s:

a. 47 B-29 sorties (22d Bomb Gp and 92d Bomb Gp) bombed CHOSEN NITROGEN FERTILIZER FACTORY 36-49N, 127-37E with excellent results. Hits observed on storage tank and main bldgs in center of target. Numerous fires and intense explosions were noted.

b. 11 B-29 sorties (19 Bomb Gp) were flown. Fol targets with results as indicated were bombed:

- (1) RR and Hwy br at 34-57N, 127-29E - poor results.
- (2) Hwy br at 35-18N, 127-08E, 4 bombs across both ends.
- (3) Hwy br at 35-22N, 127-08E - poor results.
- (4) RR br at 35-18N, 127-18E - poor results.
- (5) Hwy br at 35-54N, 127-26E - damage not known.
- (6) Hwy br's at 35-51N, 127-12E, and 35-32N, 127-05E, damage unknown.
- (7) RR br at 35-11N, 127-42E, damage unknown.
- (8) Hwy br at 35-17N, 127-08E, excellent results - bombs hit middle of bridge.

NOTE:

F-82's: 6 sorties were flown on night intruder and armed recon missions. Results of these attacks are included in par A2e.

CINCFE DIRECTED STRIKES

CINCFE message CX 58759 supplemented by CINCFE msg CX 58912 directed FEAF to center medium bomber effort on critical areas as outlined in purple.

NAVY (CARRIER) OPERATIONS

Conduct close in Air Support for UNITED NATIONS LAND Forces, KOREA utilizing CVE SICILY and CVE BADOENG STRAIT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEAF PLANNED OPERATIONS FOR 2 AUG 1950

1. FEAF Bom Com will:

a. With 1 gp atk fol tgts:

(1) First priority, visual:

- △
- (a) Hwy br, YUSONG, 36-21N, 127-21E.
 - (b) Hwy br, 3 mi SSW CHOCHIWON, 36-34N, 127-15E.
 - (c) Hwy br, TOGYE-RI, 36-30N, 127-12E.
 - (d) Hwy br, 4 mi N KONGJU, 36-21N, 127-07E.
 - (e) Two hwy br's, KONGJU, 36-28N, 127-07E.
 - (f) Hwy br's, 1/2 mi NW TONGAI-RI, 36-28N, 127-03E.
 - (g) Hwy br, CHUKCH'ON-NI, 36-36N, 126-51E.
 - (h) Hwy br, 2 mi S ANYO-RI, 37-22N, 126-56E.
 - (i) Hwy br, OSAN, 37-09N, 127-04E.
 - (j) Hwy br, OSAN, 37-09N, 127-03E.
 - (k) Two hwy br's CHONGJU, 36-37N, 127-29E.
 - (l) Hwy br, PYONGDONG-NI, 37-08N, 128-01E.
 - (m) Two hwy br's, UMSONG, 36-56N, 127-41E.
 - (n) Hwy br, 4 mi W MUNAN-NI, 36-48N, 127-37E.
 - (o) RR and hwy br, 2 mi NW WONT'ONG-NI, 36-43N, 127-32E.
 - (p) Hwy br, 3 mi N WONJU, 37-22N, 127-57E.
 - (q) RR br, 6 mi SE WONJU, 37-16N, 128-01E.
 - (r) RR br, 1 mi N TANYANG, 36-57N, 128-19E.
 - (s) RJ, KOKKYE, 37-05N, 127-52E.
 - (t) RJ, UNGYE-RI, 37-11N, 127-53E.

(2) Second priority, visual:

- (a) RR and hwy br, OSU-RI, 35-32N, 127-20E.
- (b) Hwy br, 6 mi NE CHONJU, 35-52N, 127-15E.
- (c) Hwy br, 1 mi NW KOWON-NI, 35-24N, 127-13E.
- (d) RR br, 2 mi N KOKSONG, 35-18N, 127-18E.
- (e) Hwy and RR br, 5 mi NW SINWOL-LI, 35-11N, 127-22E.
- (f) Hwy br, SINWOL-LI, 35-09N, 127-27E.
- (g) Hwy br, HWAGAI-JANG, 35-11N, 127-37E.
- (h) Hwy br, HADONG, 35-03N, 127-45E.
- (i) RR and hwy br, SE SUNCHON, 34-57N, 127-29E.
- (j) Hwy br, 1 mi NW KUNG-RI, 35-36N, 127-06E.
- (k) Five hwy br's, SEDGE CHONJU, 35-49N, 127-08E.
- (l) Hwy br, 9 mi SE KUNSAN, 35-54N, 126-50E.
- (m) Two RR br's, Hwy br, 2 mi S IRI, 35-55N, 126-56E.
- (n) RR br, S SAMNYE-RI, 35-54N, 127-04E.
- (o) Hwy br, 3 mi NE KARHYON-RI, 35-52N, 127-29E.
- (p) RR and hwy br, S SONCHON-RI, 35-40N, 127-16E.
- (q) Hwy br, 1 mi SW TAEIN, 35-39N, 126-55E.
- (r) Hwy br, 2 mi NW CHONGUP, 35-35N, 126-50E.
- (s) Hwy br, SW CHONGUP, 35-34N, 126-51E.
- (t) Hwy br, 1 mi SW KALTAM-NI, 35-31N, 127-09E.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

b. With 2 gps: Atk indust complex at HUNGNAM, 39-49N, 127-37E. (Stand down for maint is auth if nec).

c. Last resort: As selected by CG, FEAF Bom Com.

d. Conduct rcn: Day and night in NK as fol:

(1) Lines of comm: YANGSI to PYONGYANG and CHONGJIN to SAKCHU, KANGGE to PYONGYANG and CHONGJIN to WONSAN.

(2) Post strike and radar photo as required.

(3) Tri-met charting, within capabilities, as req by FEAF AX 3256 dtd 25 Jul 50.

e. Six bombs containing green leaflets will be dropped on SEOUL.

2. 5th AF will:

a. Bombers: B-26s will conduct missions under ground controller or as req by current intelligence.


b. Ftrs: Maint air superiority, perform interdiction, cover and close sup as req by our int.

c. Tac Rcn:

(1) Priority 1: Daily vis rcn w/photo verification to determine en str, composition and dir of mv within the imm battle area and S of 38 deg.

(2) Priority 2: Daily photo coverage of all en adrms S of line fr 39-00N, 125-13E to 40-00N, 127-30E thence E to coast.

(3) Priority 3: Post strike photo as required.



TAB E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RESULTS OF FEAF OPERATIONS - 160001K to 162400K AGU 50

a. 92 F-80, 28 F-51, 20 RF-80, 7 F4U, 2 F-82 sorties were flown on bombing and strafing and special missions in the fol areas: WAEGWAN-INCHON, PYONG-TAEN-KUNSAN, SANGJU-SONGHWAN, CHINJU-KWANGJU.

Strike reports indicate the fol results:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Trucks	4	7
Misc Vehs	4	3
Misc Blds	2	18
Locomotives	5	4
Misc Boats	2	8
Jeeps	2	1
Tanks	0	1
Box Cars	0	32
Small Bridges	0	2
Ferry Boat	0	1
Supply Dump	0	1

Damaged town of KUMSANG. Dropped 3 frag bombs on enemy troops located there.

b. Bombers:

(1) B-26: 31 B-26 sorties were flown on night intruder and special missions in the TEAJON-SANGJU, INCHON-ANDONG, SEOUL-TAECHON, SUWON-WAEGWAN, CHONUI-KUMCHON, SUMCHON-TUNSONG area. Targets included RR Bridge 35-53N, 127-04E and RR Bridge 35-18N, 126-46E. Results not Reptd.

(2) B-29: Approx 100 sorties were flown on medium altitude bombing mission with results as indicated: (98th & 19th Group Results)

(a) Bombs fell in area starting at AP 12 36-01N, 128-22E and continued N to SE corner town of POKSONG-DONG 36-02N, 128-22E, with E side of squadron pattern about 1 mile W of W bank NANTONG River.

(b) 9 B-29s bomb patterns started at AP 11 36-01N, 128-21E and continued N in barely W of point short of SE corner of town of WUL-TONG 36-03N, 128-21E.

(c) 9 B-29s bombed AP 7 36-02N, 128-18E with excellent bomb patterns for all.

(d) 8 B-29s bombed AP 8 36-02N, 128-21E with excellent bomb patterns for all.

(e) 1 B-29 on leaflet mission dropped behind enemy lines with unknown results.

Reports not yet received from 307th Bomb Group and 22d Bomb Group. Verbal report from FEAF indicates 58 sorties, exclusive of above two unreported groups.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

RESULTS OF NAVY (CARRIER) OPERATIONS

7th Fleet flash summary air operations 160528Z indicate the fol results:

At PYONGCHANG strafed large transformer, burned weapons carrier. At WONJU damaged hwy bridge, strafed 3 box cars, burned 2. At TANYANG 1500 direct hits on RR bridge. Blew up hydroelectric plant with rockets and bombs. Completely destroyed, strafed, and started fires in large coal yards. Strafed quonset huts and bridge under water. Strafed and damaged locomotive coming out of tunnel near TANGYANG. At MANYUNG burned 1 large gas truck, 1 transformer and 2 trucks. At CHECHON burned 8 trucks, 1 tank, 2 box cars, and fuel dump. Blew up ammunition truck and arty piece. Strafed and bombed 3 power stations and 1 transformer. Burned 2 trucks of fuel oil. Strafed supply dump. At NURUNGNI, strafed and damaged power station and 9 trucks. Bridge 36-128 knocked out. Destroyed 2 motorcycles and 1 camouflaged fuel dump at ANDONG. Started several fires at M/Y at SAMCHOK. Burned large transformer station at YONGDOK. At WONJU, hit RR Bridge and destroyed underneath support. Strafed 12 box cars. Rocketed 3 tunnels containing trains. At CHECHON, strafed and destroyed 7 trucks and 5 carts loaded with inflammable material. Strafed supply dump and 5 trucks. Exploded locomotive in tunnel, strafed train in tunnel at CHUPORI. Bombed, rocketed, and strafed 4 villages W of YONSAN, all burned. Bombed, rocketed, and strafed CHONGNA and CHANGSI-DONG, started many fires. Bombed, rocketed, and strafed 3 villages in YONGSANE, all burned. Bombed and strafed troops in 9 villages NE of POHANG-DONG. All villages on fire.

At KIGYE, burned 5 vehs, dropped 2 depth charges and 6 rockets on troop concentrations. At HUNGHAE strafed 7 camouflaged trucks, 4 were burned. At SODONGNI strafed truck and jeep full of troops. 15 miles west POHANG hit troop concentration with 6 500-lb bombs and 24 rockets. Strafed 5 camouflaged vehs and burned 3 NW POHANG. Bombed, rocketed, and strafed large troop concentration near PIHAKSAN with heavy casualties.

182 sorties were flown today.

* * * * *

PLANNED OPERATIONS

FEAF - 17 Aug 50

1. Bomb Comd:

a. W/3 groups will atk and destroy key transportation targets of the NK transportation system as listed below:

- (1) 307th Bomb Group: (6 Acft)
 - (a) RR Bridge 39-00N, 125-44E (A1)
 - (b) Hwy Bridge 39-01N, 125-45E (B1)
 - (c) RR Bridge 39-40N, 125-34E (J1)

△

- (d) RR Bridge 39-55N, 125-15E (A2)
- (e) RR Bridge 39-58N, 125-15E (B2)
- (f) RR Bridge 39-58N, 126-07E (C2)
- (g) RR Bridge 38-53N, 125-37E (D2)
- (h) RR Bridge 38-41N, 125-45E (E2)
- (i) RR Bridge 38-25N, 125-42E (H2)
- (k) RR Bridge 39-15N, 126-12E (K2)
- (l) RR Bridge 39-17N, 126-24E (L2)
- (m) RR Bridge 39-37N, 125-37E (M2)
- (n) Rd Junction 38-31N, 125-44E (H3)

(2) 98th Bomb Group: (6 Acft)

- (a) RR Bridge 39-54N, 127-32E (G1)
- (b) Hwy Bridge 39-54N, 127-31E (H1)
- (c) RR Bridge 39-27N, 127-07E (J2)
- (d) RR Bridge 38-53N, 127-26E (N2)
- (e) RR Bridge 38-26N, 127-15E (O2)
- (f) RR Bridge 41-43N, 129-42E (P2)
- (g) RR Bridge 40-32N, 129-08E (Q2)
- (h) RR Bridge 40-35N, 129-10E (R2)
- (i) RR Bridge 38-18N, 128-33E (S2)
- (j) RR Bridge 38-24N, 128-28E (T2)
- (k) RR Bridge 38-26N, 128-27E (U2)
- (l) RR Bridge 40-10N, 128-22E (V2)

(3) 19th Bomb Group: (6 Acft)

- (a) RR Bridge 37-21N, 126-57E (C1)
- (b) RR Bridge 37-33N, 127-19E (E1)
- (c) RR Bridge 38-10N, 125-43E (G-2)
- (d) RR Bridge 37-53N, 126-44E (A3)
- (e) RR Bridge 37-55N, 127-04E (B3)
- (f) Hwy Bridge 37-55N, 127-03E (L3)
- (g) Hwy Bridge 37-24N, 127-15E (E3)
- (h) Hwy Bridge 37-52N, 127-41E (F3)
- (i) Rd Junction 38-16N, 127-12E (G3)
- (j) Hwy Bridge 37-41N, 127-53E (I3)
- (k) RR Bridge 37-32N, 127-07E (K3)

b. Conduct Rcn per No. 1 to 00, 48-50 for 16 Aug 50 (cite ZX 5075 OP-OP, 14 Aug) which is further amnd as fols: "Secure photocov of Uliad-Do, Kuaman-Do and Chuk-Po Is in Sea of Japan, 37-30N, 130-52E, at min scale 1/10,000 radar sta rptd in this island gp.

c. 2 groups planned to stay down for maint.

2. 5th Air Force:

a. Bombers: Atk targets as determined by CG 5th AF in Korea. Authorized to atk targets in NE Korean coastal area as indicated by current int reports.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- b. Ftrs: Maintain air superiority, perform close spt. interdiction and cover.
- c. Destroy and maintain destruction of pontoon bridge near triple bridge complex at SEOUL.
- d. Atk key enemy communication targets S of 38° N per FEAF msg AX 5034 dated 3 Aug 50 and others as selected by CG 5th AF to include the fol bridges:
 - (1) RR Bridge 37-29N, 127-37E
 - (2) RR Bridge 36-43N, 128-40E
- e. Conduct recon as directed per amendment #1 to 00 48-50 for 16 Aug 50 (Cite AX 5075 dated 14 Aug 50) and further amended by FEAF AX 5085 dated 15 Aug 50.

CINCFE DIRECTED STRIKE

CINCFE directed that TF 77 would conduct opns in area F rpt. F with particular attention to transportation and lines of communication targets in the general area WONSAN 39-10N, 127-28 E - CHONGJIN 41-47N, 129-50E.

DELAYED REPORT - 150001K to 152400K AUG 50

1. FEAF


- a. 11 B-29s (307th Bomb Group) bombed RR Bridge 39-40N, 125-34E and damaged approach to bridge.
- b. 4 B-29s bombed RR Bridge 39-55N, 125-15E and damaged approach to bridge.
- c. 3 B-29s bombed BOGUN Chemical plant at NAMCHUNG. Results unobserved.

NAVY (CARRIER) 17 AUG 50

- 1. CTG 96.8 (USS SICILY and USS BADOENG STRAIT) will furnish acft to JOC for close ground spt.
- 2. TG 77.4 (USS VALLEY FORGE and USS PHILIPPINE SEA) on night of 16-17 Aug 50 returned, then moved N and on 17 Aug 50 strike SHONGJIN to WOSAN. AREA F.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED



TAB F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RESULTS OF FEAF OPERATIONS 010001K - 012400K

1. Fighter Bombers: 107 F-80, 165 F-51, 5 F-82, and 9 F-4U sorties were flown on bombing and strafing, close support, night intruder and interdiction missions in the battle line area, CHUNGJU-YONGPYONG area, and north of the 37th Parallel with the fol results rept:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Tanks	17	10
Trucks	12	6
Buildings w/troops	13	9
Supply dumps	3	2
Gun Emplacements	2	-
Vehicles	15	15
Fuel Dumps	2	-
Locomotives	4	3
RR Cars	2	10

A total of 231 sorties were flown in close support of ground operations.

2. Bombers:

a. 32 B-26 sorties were flown in bombing, strafing and night intruder missions with fol results rept: SEOUL AIRFIELD and pontoon bridge at SEOUL bombed with unknown results. Rail lines between SUWON and PYONGTAEK were damaged and other lines of comm throughout the area were attacked with good results. 18 B-26 effective sorties were flown, bombing and strafing vehicles, bldgs housing enemy trp, convoys, road, and RR bridges, M/Ys and targets in the fol areas: CHUNGJU, CHINNAMPO, CHECHON, SEOUL, KUNSAN, SUWON, TAEJON, INCHON, TANYANG, CHINJU, and MOKPO. Incomplete results, are as fol: Destroyed 1 locomotive, 1 RR car; damaged 3 vehicles, and 13 RR cars.

b. B-29, 19 B-29 sorties were flown on bombing missions with results as fol:

(1) 6 B-29 (19 Bomb Gp) bombed bridge at 38-59N, 125-45E. Four to six direct hits in center of bridge reported.

(2) 12 B-29 (22 Bomb Gp) bombed fol bridges with results as indicated:

- (a) Hwy Br, 37-52N, 127-41E 1 Span down
- (b) RR Br, 40-35N, 129-10E 1 Span down
- (c) RR Br, 37-55N, 127-03E Results rept exc.dam not rept
- (d) RR Br, 38-53N, 127-26E 1 Span down
- (e) Double RR Br, 38-36N, 126-04E Br still intact.
- (f) RR Br, Tgt opp, 40-22N, 128-53E Res. poor to exc. spec dam not rept.
- (g) RR Br, Tgt opp, 38-11N, 126-58E Res. poor, specific dam not rept.

(3) 1 B-29 (92 Bomb Gp) performed leaflet drop along battle line with excellent results.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

RESULTS OF NAVY (CARRIER) OPERATIONS
1 September 1950

CTG 77 (USS PHILIPPINE SEA and USS VALLEY FORGE) launched 183 sorties on interdiction and close support missions in the PYONGYANG, CHINAMPO, SEOUL, CHUNCHWA, INCHON, MUNSAN, KAEPODONG, CHOGYE, and NAKTONG RIVER areas with the fol results rept:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>	<u>Bombed &/or Strafed</u>
□ Bridges	2	1	2
RR Cars	31	36	-
RR Yards	-	-	-
Warehouses	-	16	-
Oil Tanks	-	-	3
Fishing Boats	2	11	13
Barracks	-	-	1
Trucks	15	47	-
Factory	-	?	-
Buildings	4	-	-
Villages	4	4	-
Supply Dump	-	-	1
Troop Concentration	-	-	2
Rafts	3	-	7
Small Craft	-	-	10
Arty pos.	-	-	1
		(Silenced)	

CTG 96.8 (USS BADOENG STRAIT and USS SICILY) were at SASEBO and did not operate carrier aircraft.

* * * * *

PLANNED OPERATIONS

FEAF - 2 Sep 50

1. Bomber Command:

a. 2 Gps (19th and 22d Bomb Gps) 16 B-29 acft will atk fol priority key RR and Hwy bridges of the N KOREAN transportation system:

- △
- (1) RR Bridge 39-40N, 125-34E (1)
 - (2) RR Bridge 37-53N, 126-44E (21)
 - (3) New RR Bridge at SEOUL, 2300 ft N of triple bridge complex
 - (4) RR Bridge 39-00N, 125-44E (6)
 - (5) RR Bridge 37-33N, 127-19E (17)
 - (6) RR Bridge 37-21N, 127-57E (29)
 - (7) RR Bridge 39-37N, 125-37E (5)


- b. 1 Gp (307th Bomb Gp) 24 B-29 acft will atk fol towns in the Southern sector of the battle line in direct support of ground forces:
 - 1. CHINJU
 - 2. KUMCHON
 - 3. KOCHANG
 - c. 2 Gps (92d and 98th Bomb Gp) will stand down for maintenance and crew rest.
 - d. Conduct recon as directed by FEAF Opn Order 64-50 for 1 Sep 50.
2. 5th AF:
- a. Conduct armed recon against NK aflds as required to insure air superiority, and as dictated by curr int.
 - b. Conduct armed recon against rolling stock on key rail and hwy arteries on east coast KOREA between 3830N and 4030N.
 - c. Maint destruction of folg bridges at SEOUL.
 - (1) Pontoon bridge approx 4000 ft N of triple bridge complex.
 - (2) Pontoon bridge next to hwy bridge approx 2500 ft SE of triple bridge complex.
 - (3) The removable double pontoon bridge approx 6300 ft NW of triple bridge complex, to include ferries in this area.
 - d. Maint air superiority, perform close support, interdiction and cover as required.
 - e. Atk and destroy ferry boats and landing facilities located 375430 N - 1264430 E on IMJIN-GANG River approx 7 mi NW MUNSAN.
 - f. Atk key eny comm tgts S of 3800 N per FEAF msg AX 5034, dtd 3 Aug 50, and others as selected by CG 5th AF.
 - g. Conduct recon as directed by FEAF Opn Order 64-50 for 1 Sep 50.

PLANNED NAVY (CARRIER) OPERATIONS
020001K to 022400K Sep 50

- 1. CTG 96.8 (USS SICILY and USS BADOENG STRAIT) at SASEBO.
- 2. CTF 77 (USS PHILIPPINE SEA and USS VALLEY FORGE) will furnish acft to JOC for close support of ground operations and will perform armed recon from TOESONG-DONG S to beach to a depth of 10 miles W of bomb line including river.
- 3. HMS TRIUMPH at SASEBO.

CINCFE DIRECTED STRIKES

CINCFE msg CX 61755, 1 September 1950, directs that COMNAVFE and CG, FEAF, coordinate to provide all-out close air support for 8th Army immediately and until further orders.



RCN AREA "B"

JAPAN

SEA

Visual and photo RCN daily alternating RCN "A" and "B", day and night.

KOREA

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
MILES

RESULTS OF FEAF OPERATIONS 08001K to 082400K SEP 50

1. Fighter Bombers: 266 sorties were flown by US 5th AF, RAAF, and USMC on night intruder, close support, and interdiction missions with the fol results reported:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>	<u>Bombed & Strafed</u>
Tanks	4	5	--
Trucks	9	13	--
Vehicles	13	11	--
RR Cars	-	6	--
Small Boat s	6	-	--
Buildings	2	4	--
Gun Emplacements	6	12	--
Sup Dump	1	-	--

2. Bombers:

a. B-26s: 34 B-26 plus 1 F-82 sorties were flown on bombing and strafing and night intruder missions in PYONGYANG, SARIWON, HAEJU, SEOUL, KAESONG, SACHON, INCHON, SUWON, TAEJON, CHONGJU, CHUNG-JU area with the fol results reported:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>	<u>Bombed & Strafed</u>
Trucks	2	-	-
Gun Emplacements	1	-	-
Bridges	1	1	1
En Troop Concentrations	-	-	?

b. B-29s: 40 B-29s bombed the following targets with results as indicated:

<u>Bomb Gp</u>	<u>No of Acft</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>Results</u>
19th BG	9	Wooden RR Bridge at SEOUL	Excellent 1 span out
		RR Bridge (3825-12542)	Poor
		RR Bridge (3758-12617)	Poor
		RR Bridge (3759-12623)	Poor
		RR Br and Hwy Br(3950-12450)	Poor - short of target
22d BG	24	RR Bridge (3955-12445)	Fair
		Iron Works SEISHIN	Excellent -secondary explosions
92d BG	7	M/Yds at SINANJU	Good to excellent choke point and warehouse hit.

RESULTS OF NAVY (CARRIER) OPERATIONS
070001K to 072400K SEP 50

1. CTG 96.8: USS BADOENG STRAIT flew 31 F4U sorties in area "O" with the fol results reported: 2 acft strafed on the KIMPO airfield; 5 boxcars damaged and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

60 others strafed or rocketed in marshalling yards west of KAESONG and at 983-1652; earth-filled railway bridge 2 mi west of RONKEN-RI rendered useless by direct hit; railway bridge southeast of RONKEN-RI bombed with the result that 1 span disintegrated and adjoining span fell in river; a parallel wooden RR bridge southeast of KIMJONG-NI was damaged; MADOP-TONG dual-purpose rail and hwy bridge badly damaged by direct hit.

2. TF 77 at SASEBO.
3. HMS TRIUMPH. No results reported.

PLANNED OPERATIONS

FEAF - 8 Sep 50

1. Bomber Command:

a. 2 gp (92d and 307th Bomb Gp) (32 B-29 Acft) will atk Japan Magnesite Chemical Industry and RR yards at SONGJIN 40-42N, 129-13E.

b. 1 gp (19th Bomb Gp) (8 B-29 Acft) will atk key rail and hwy bridges of NK transportation system with priority of targets in order listed, if not previously destroyed:

- (1) SEOUL RR br 2300 ft N of triple br complex 37-31N, 125-57E.
- (2) Hwy br N of RR and E of CHONGJU 39-42N, 125-14E.
- (3) Hwy br W of KWAKSAN 39-42N, 125-04E.
- (4) Hwy br across TONGNAE River 39-44N, 125-00E.
- (5) RR Bridge 39-00N, 125-44E (4) (Raz on tgt)
- (6) Hwy Bridge 39-01N, 125-45E (3)
- (7) RR Bridge 39-37N, 125-37E (1) (Raz on tgt)
- (8) RR Bridge 39-01N, 125-55E (5)
- (9) Hwy Bridge 39-37N, 125-37E (2)

c. 1 B-29 acft will conduct leaflet drop over en troops along battleline from 35-07N, 128-25E to 35-40N, 128-25E.

d. 2 gp (22d and 98th) will stand down for crew rest and maintenance.

e. Conduct recon as dir by FEAF Opn Order 71-50 for 8 Sep.

2. 5th AF:

a. Highest priority mission is to provide all but close support as requested by CG Eighth Army.

b. Next priority to Par 2a above is armed recon against NK aflds as required to insure air superiority and as dictated by curr int.

c. Commensurate w/effort expended per Par 2a and b above, perform fol missions:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

- _____ (1) Maint destruction of fol brdgs at SEOUL:
- (a) The removable double pontoon brdg aprx 6300 ft NW of the triple brdg complex, to include ferries in this area.
 - (b) Pontoon brdg aprx 4000 ft north of triple brdg complex.
 - (c) Pontoon brdg next to hwy brdg aprx 2500 ft SE of the triple brdg complex.
- _____ (2) Atk and destroy ferry boats and landing facilities located 374330N-1264430E on IMJIN-GANG River aprx 7 mi NW of MUNSAN.
- _____ (3) Atk key en comm tgts S of 3800 N per FEAF msg AX 5034, dtd 3 Aug 50, and others as selected by CG 5th AF.
- d. Conduct recon as dir by FEAF Opn Order 71-50 for 8 Sep 50.

PLANNED NAVY (CARRIER) OPERATIONS 8 SEP 50

1. CTG 96.8 USS BADOENG STRAIT and USS SICILY will conduct operations in area "P".
2. TF 77 at SASEBO.
3. HMS TRIUMPH will conduct air operations in WONSAN area.

CINCFE DIRECTED STRIKE

CINCFE msg 62280, 7 Sep 50 directs that COMNAVFE and CG FEAF resume "normal" rather than "all out" close air support for ground operations.

DELAYED RESULTS NAVY (CARRIER) OPERATIONS 6 SEP 50

1. CTU 96.53.1 (HMS TRIUMPH) conducted armed recon in the INCHON to KUNSAN area with the fol results rept: Strafed and rocketed causeway and railway station areas at INCHON with no results reported. Attacks made on six 80-ton motor coasters which resulted in heavy damage or sinking of ships.

UNCLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
Adjutant General's Office
Radio and Cable Center

COPY

INCOMING MESSAGE

JA/rbo

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

17 Aug 50

FROM: CG EUSAK
TO: CINCFE, CG 5TH AF IN KOREA, CG 5TH AF NAGOYA
NR: 21282 KGO

The following information is furnished on results of the B-29 bombing effort in the Waegwan Area on 16 Aug 50:

A. 98 airplanes dropped 960 tons of bombs. Aiming points selected within the area appeared to be well hit. Due to smoke and dust, observation was increasingly difficult as the attack progressed.

B. Observation from light aircraft after the attack revealed an excellent pattern. Road and rail lines between Kumchon and Waegwan were cut and several small villages were destroyed.

C. US and ROK ground forces in area report NK forces partial withdrawing across Naktong River to the West subsequent to the attack. No general withdrawal is indicated. Bombs dropped too far to the West for any observation of results from the ground. Friendly units in Waegwan Area, which had been receiving heavy enemy arty fire prior to the attack, report that there has been no enemy artillery fire in their area since air attack. Subsequent to the air attack our patrols could not penetrate to the impact area. Patrolling continues to attempt to determine positive results of bombing. Believe bombing had definite psychological effect on enemy and boosting effect on friendly troops.

D. The extent of damage can be better ascertained, to a limited degree, from post strike photos when they become avail. 5th AF reports strike photos will avail today to permit partial assessment. However, complete evaluation of results cannot be made until ground observation can be made of the impact area and from confidential sources. I am of opinion that these strikes are of definite psychological advantage but would be of more value where they can be followed up immediately by ground assault into and through the bombed area.

WALKER

ACTION: G-3

INFORMATION: COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-2, GHQ TGT
GP, G-4, AG, JSPOG, SIGNAL, FEAFF, COMNAVFE, 8A, LNO
25968
TOO: 171140K
MCN: 2336

58

TAB H

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS AND OPERATIONS GROUP

1950

REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM BOMBERS

<u>Date</u> 1950	<u>No.</u> <u>Mission</u> <u>Ready</u>	<u>Employed</u> <u>on Strate-</u> <u>gic Tgts</u>	<u>Employed</u> <u>Battle</u> <u>Area Tgts</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Employed</u>	<u>% Combat Ready</u> <u>Utilized in</u> <u>Battle area</u>
Jul 9	7	10 - Seoul	None	10	%/7
10	6	None	11	11	150%/6
11	12	None	8	8	66%/12
12	12	9 - Seoul	None	9	0%/12
13	22	50 - Wonsan	None	50	0%/22
14	22	None	10	10	46%/22
15	22	3 - Kimpo	8	11	37%/22
16	22	47 - Seoul	8	55	37%/22
17	22	1 - Kimpo	8	9	34%/22
18	22	1 - Seoul	0	2	5%/22
19	22	8 - Seoul	0	8	0%/22
20	22	21 - Pyongyang & Seoul	0	21	0%/22
21	22	10 - Pyongyang & Vicinity	14	24	67%/22
22	--	16 - Nanam	6	22	---
23	22	15 Pyongyang	5	20	23%/22
24	22	0	15	24	70%/22
25	22	0	15	23	70%/22
26	22	0	22	22	100%/22
27	22	14	8	22	37%/22
28	22	14	8	22	37%/22
29	8	8	0	8	0%/8
30	22	48	0	48	0%/22
31	22	0	16	16	73%/22
Aug 1	22	47	11	58	50%/22
2	22	0	9	9	41%/22
3	22	39	8	47	37%/22
4	22	12	0	12	0%/22
5	22	21	0	21	0%/22
6	8	8	0	8	0%/8
7	22	75	0	75	0%/22
8	22	22	0	22	0%/22
9	22	19	0	19	0%/22
10	22	72	0	72	0%/22
11	40	17	0	17	0%/40
12	40	75	0	75	0%/40
13	40	24	0	24	0%/40
14	40	24	0	24	0%/40
15	40	16	0	16	0%/40

	<u>Date</u> 1950	<u>No.</u> <u>Mission</u> <u>Ready</u>	<u>Employed</u> <u>on Strate-</u> <u>gic Tgts</u>	<u>Employed</u> <u>Battle</u> <u>Area Tgts</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Employed</u>	<u>% Combat Ready</u> <u>Utilized in</u> <u>Battle area</u>
Aug	16	40	98	98	98	250% / 40
	17	40	14	0	14	0% / 40
	18	40	22	0	22	0% / 40
	19	40	89	0	89	0% / 40
	20	40	24	0	24	0% / 40
	21	40	25	0	25	0% / 40
	22	40	81	0	81	0% / 40
	23	40	22	0	19	0% / 40
	24	40	40	0	40	0% / 40
	25	40	73	0	73	0% / 40
	26	40	13	0	13	0% / 40
	27	40	43	0	43	0% / 40
	28	40	71	0	71	0% / 40
	29	40	44	0	44	0% / 40
	30	40	23	0	23	0% / 40
	31	40	92	0	92	0% / 40
Sep	1	40	19	0	19	0% / 40
	2	40	15	25	40	83% / 40
	3	40	17	47	64	102% / 40
	4	40	19	0	19	0% / 40
	5	40	43	0	43	0% / 40
	6	40	43	0	43	0% / 40
	7	40	40	0	40	0% / 40
	8	40	42	0	42	0% / 40
	9	40	43	0	43	0% / 40

TAB I

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 FAR EAST COMMAND
 Public Information Office

1015
 15 August 1950

FEAF REPORTS ON FIRST MONTH OF OPERATIONS

Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, U.S. Far East Air Forces Commander, today released portions of a detailed report on the first month of operations by FEAF Bomber Command.

More than 23,000 bombs, totaling more than 7,000 tons of high explosive bombs, were dropped from Superfortresses on North Korean objectives between the July 13 to Aug 12 period, Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, FEAF Bomber Commander, reported to General Stratemeyer.

Five major targets felt the heaviest blows from the B-29 Superforts: The Wonsan marshalling yards and oil refinery, the Konsan chemical muni-complex, the Pyongyang marshalling yards and arsenal, the Seoul marshalling yards and the Najin-dong dock facilities. These targets received 3,733 tons of bombs of the more than 7,000 tons delivered.

The following is a resume of the tonnage and effect:

<u>Target</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Percentage Destroyed</u>
1. WONSAN		
a. Marshalling yard	260	65 percent
b. Dock area	476	30 percent destroyed and 20 percent heavily damaged
c. Oil refinery	223	80 percent
2. KOWAN		
a. Chosen Nitrogen Explosive Co	430	85 percent
b. Chosen Nitrogen Fertilizer Co	422	75 percent
c. Bogun Chemical Co	358	10 percent heavily damaged and 35 percent destroyed
3. PYONGYANG		
a. Marshalling yards	359	Virtually all
b. Arsenal	133	60 to 75 percent
4. SEOUL		
a. Marshalling yards	550	Virtually all
5. NAJIN-DONG		
a. Port and rail center	502	Unobserved results

TAB J

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The pressure against outnumbered U. S. troops on the ground called for the Bomber Command to be assigned to a tactical mission during a portion of the month, and slightly better than half the bomb tonnage total was directed in the interdiction program to isolate the battlefield by destroying key rail and road bridges in Central Korea.

The first portion of the period, B-29s were employed in the rear of the immediate battle area. During the latter portion, they focused attention on rail targets north of the 38th parallel.

Weather necessitated bombing by radar on many of the targets, but post-strike photographs in most cases confirm the accuracy of bombing by this method.


Operational losses were extremely low compared to the total missions and hours flown. After the command was activated only one Superfort was crippled so that it had to be abandoned. (Prior to the activation of FEAF Bomber Command one B-29 was shot down by the enemy.)

General O'Donnell's earlier prediction that 5,000 tons of bombs would be delivered during the month was exceeded by better than 2,000 tons.

TAB J

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

1ST MARINE BRIGADE TACP LOCATION AND CONTROL AIRCRAFT
(When brigade is not in the line, Marine aircraft report into MELLOW)



TAB L

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
Public Information Office

COPY

1800
26 August 1950

REPORT ON FIRST SIXTY DAYS OPERATION OF FEAF

"The enemy in Korea has been severely crippled by the staggering impact of 20,500 sorties flown by all types of U.S. Air Force planes, but not without some cost to us," Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Commanding General of the Far East Air Forces, said today.

In an interim report based on operations for the first 60 days of the Korean conflict, General Stratemeyer said the Far East Air Forces under his command have put forth a tremendous effort by pounding the enemy, not only at his source of war potential but also at his supplies, his communications, and directly against him in the battle zones.

General Stratemeyer listed Air Force personnel losses at 26 dead, 23 wounded and 45 missing.

Against our losses, he reported in detail on the 20,559 individual tactical and strategic combat sorties, and transport support sorties flown from the beginning of the conflict until midnight 24 Aug and directed against the Communists in support of the United Nations war effort.

Thirteen thousand fighter sorties have been flown by Fifth Air Force F-80s, F-51s, and F-82s. These missions were made under varied weather conditions and during day and night. Almost 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition were fired from the fighters' machine guns, with 33,000 rockets launched and 1,700 tons of bombs dropped.

The B-26 light bombers directed their fire power against the enemy in 1,300 day and night sorties, firing 656,000 rounds of ammunition, 670 rockets and dropping 2,000 tons of bombs.

B-29 Superforts of the FEAF Bomber Command have now reached a total of more than 1,500 sorties, with 11,500 tons of general purpose high explosive bombs dropped. About half this tonnage has been directed against key industrial targets which are the source of North Koreans war supply. Several of the major targets, including the Konan (Hungnam) chemical and munitions complex, the Wonsan oil refinery and the Pyongyang marshalling yards and arsenal, have been almost completely destroyed. The other half of the B-29 bomb tonnage has been dropped on railroad and highway bridges and marshalling yards in a planned interdiction program to deprive Communist troops at the front of badly needed supplies and reinforcements.

Today's report listed 4,800 tons of supplies and 10,000 service personnel

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

flown from Japan to Korea in 2,800 flights, with the airplanes returning 3,000 persons from the battle area since the air evacuation program got underway.

In support of the combat missions, a total of 1,700 reconnaissance flights of all types have been flown. More than half were flown by tactical air controllers in T-6s who directed combat airplanes to pin point targets. Other reconnaissance flights were made to observe and photograph bombing and strafing results, to gather weather data and to locate enemy concentrations.

The figures for enemy airplanes destroyed are 72, compared to 58 U.S. Air Force airplanes lost in the 20,500 sorties flown.

More than 600 attacks have been made on North Korean tanks, armored cars or half-tracks by Air Force airplanes since the start of the conflict, damage being inflicted on some, others being totally destroyed. The GHQ evaluated analysis credits air power with confirmed destruction of 111 tanks with no evaluated estimate of the number damaged.

Fighters and bombers have consistently flown close support for the UN ground forces during this period, in addition to directing their fire power against targets which add up to the following destroyed or damaged totals: locomotives--142; boxcars--800; bridges--212; vehicles (all types)--3,133; field pieces--180; and a large number of storage warehouses, oil tanks, enemy troop concentrations and other targets.

These figures do not include detailed destruction caused by B-29s, especially in their heavy attacks in rail marshalling yards which frequently contained as many as 500 boxcars and locomotives immediately prior to heavy high altitude bombing attacks.

TAB M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFANTRY BATTALION

TACP'S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS X CORPS
APO 909 US ARMY

26 January 1951

INFANTRY BATTALION TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTIES

1. PROBLEM: To determine the practicability of employing Infantry Battalion Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP's), composed of Infantry Battalion personnel and equipment, in the control of tactical air support aircraft through airborne controllers (AT-6 Mosquito).

2. ASSUMPTION: That Air Force TACP's below Infantry Regiments will not be available, in Korea, in the near future.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. Prior to 15 January 1951 each US Infantry Battalion in X Corps organized a TACP. Each of these TACP's, consisting of one officer, one radio operator and one driver, is equipped with one 1/4 ton truck and one SCR 300.

b. Practicability of using SCR 300 radios for air-ground communications was established through X Corps tests conducted during the period 18-21 January. L-5 type aircraft were used on this occasion.

c. On 13-14 January, X Corps Special Activities Group successfully contacted mosquito aircraft equipped with SCR 300 radios during offensive operations against enemy groups South of CHANG-TO (DR3969). In these particular attacks the air-ground teamwork succeeded in destroying 342 enemy.

4. DISCUSSION:

a. During the extensive operations directed by X Corps in Korea - from the amphibious landings at INCHON and WONSAN, the river crossings at the HAN, the city combat in SEOUL, the rapid advances across rugged mountainous terrain in North Korea to the Manchurian border, to the historical withdrawal from HUNGNAM - one of the major factors contributing to the success of air-ground operations was the tactical air control concept utilized by X Corps. Basically, this is the Marine concept and provides for the inclusion of TACP's as organic units in Infantry Battalions. Combat experience in operations over extended fronts and in extremely rugged terrain conclusively proves that effective and efficient air support can be assured only if TACP's are physically present with each Infantry Battalion. Basic functions of TACP's - direction of offensive air support aircraft to targets in the vicinity of friendly positions and the reporting of observed results - cannot be effectively accomplished if the TACP's are located several miles in rear of the front lines. In rugged terrain and over extremely poor roads found in Korea, many hours are wasted and opportunities to destroy the enemy are lost if TACP's have to be shifted from one Battalion to another. One TACP per Infantry Battalion is a fundamental requisite to successful air-ground operations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b. In view of the shortage of Air Force TACP's, it has become apparent that, for the present, not more than four TACP's per Division will be provided in Korea by the Air Force. Thus, a serious deficiency in air-ground operations has resulted. Foreseeing this, the X Corps Commander, early in October 1950, directed Infantry Divisions under his command to organize and train Infantry Battalion TACP's, utilizing Ground Force personnel. With the training assistance of Air Force personnel in X Corps, this objective was attained by 15 January 1951. Each US Infantry Battalion in X Corps now has one trained TACP consisting of one officer, one radio operator and one driver. Each is equipped with one 1/4 ton truck and one SCR 300 radio.

c. In order to establish the practicability of using SCR 300 radios for air-ground and air to air communications, X Corps conducted tests during the period 18-21 January with Infantry Battalion TACP sets (SCR 300) and light aircraft equipped with the same type radio. No difficulty was encountered 18 January, with the result that excellent communications were established between the testing plane and each battalion of the 2d Infantry Division. Temperatures on this date varied between 15° and 35° F. Other tests 20-21 January were not as successful - only 7 out of 12 stations were contacted on 20 January and 5 out of 12 stations on 21 January. However, this difficulty is attributed to battery freezing - inasmuch as the temperature aloft was 10° below zero on 20 January and 20° below zero on 21 January. This difficulty can be overcome by equipping the SCR 300 with cold weather batteries in L type aircraft, or, as already practiced, by utilizing heated Mosquito (AT-6) aircraft. Locations of Infantry Battalions participating in this test are indicated on Inclosure 1.

d. On 13-14 January, the X Corps Special Activities Group conducted successful air-ground operations utilizing Infantry SCR 300 radios for communicating with an air controller in a Mosquito (AT-6) also equipped with an SCR 300. Successful results in this operation - evidenced by the fact that 342 enemy were killed through air-ground teamwork - proved conclusively the feasibility of utilizing this system for controlling and directing air strikes. When heater equipped Mosquito aircraft are used, the cold weather difficulties outlined in paragraph 3c above are overcome.

e. An additional area in which progress can be achieved is in the adaptation of the artillery communications and fire control means to the problem of control of close support aviation. The artillery observation net blankets the front, and the artillery possesses a reliable communications system. That these skilled specialists could be given additional training to permit their extensive employment in the allocation and control of air strikes is indicated.

f. Factors enumerated above form the basis for achievement of more comprehensive close air support than experienced during the period 1-21 January, when only 4 TACP's per Division were available. Uniform effectiveness is now promised by Eighth Army - Fifth Air Force agreement to:

- (1) Equip all Mosquitos with the SCR 300.
- (2) Equip liaison aircraft with SCR 300.
- (3) Authorize direct communication between Infantry Battalions liaison aircraft and Air Controller (Mosquito) aircraft. Eighth Army message, 20 January 1951, attached as Inclosure 2.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

5. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Complete air-ground operations control can be assured if TACP's are established within each Infantry Battalion. If Air Force TACP's are not available to fulfill this requirement, Infantry Divisions must organize and train their own.

b. Effective air-ground communications can be established through utilization of Infantry SCR 300 radios, both on the ground and in Air Controller aircraft (Inclosure 3).

c. An alternate means of communication and control which merits study is the adaptation of Field Artillery Communication to the problem of the application of firepower of close support aviation. See Annex 4.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That all air controller planes (AT -6 - Mosquito) be equipped with SCR 300 radios.

b. That all Infantry Battalions organize organic TACP's.


J. H. CHILES
Lt Col, GSC
ACofS, G-3

4 Incls:

1. Map - X Corps TACP's, 21 Jan 51
2. Eighth Army Msg Dtd 20 Jan 51
3. Tactical Air Close Spt Chart
4. Plan for Coordination of Supporting Weapons

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS X CORPS
APO 909 US ARMY

INCOMING MESSAGE
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CLA/mej

20 Jan 51

FROM : CG ARMY EIGHT
TO : CG X CORPS, CG 1ST MAR DIV, CG I CORPS, CG IX CORPS
INFO : CG 5TH AF KOREA
NR : GX-1-1373 KAR

Front line units are auth to contact Mosquito planes direct on SCR 300 channel 20 frequency 44 MC to indicate targets. Mosquito will direct strikes on targets indicated.

NO SIG

ACTION : G-3

INFORMATION : CG, CS, G-2

NOTE : This msg received in AG RAD BR at 2015151.

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED.

AG CONTROL NO. 23059 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE


TOO : 2010041
MCN : 1373

Incl #2




72

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

TACTICAL AIR CLOSE SUPPORT NET



| Off
 | EM
 | 1/4 T Trk
 | SCR 300



W ⊖ SCR 300 W ⊕ SCR 399
 W ○ SCR 193 W ⊕ VHF

Ground Radio ———
 VHF - - - - -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


PLAN FOR COORDINATION
OF SUPPORTING WEAPONS
OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION
INCLUDING ARTILLERY AND AIR

Plan proposed by
Brig Gen Homer W. Kiefer
CG, Div Arty, 7th Inf Div


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

PRESENT ORGANIZATION ARTILLERY



PROPOSED ORGANIZATION
ARTILLERY WITH AIR SUPPORT



Div Arty CG and Staff
(Includes Air Liaison Officer)

Artillery Regimental Liaison Officer (5)
Air Liaison Officer (3)

Battalion Liaison Officer (9) (Performs
additional duties of FAC only to extent
needed to identify target to strike aircraft)

Forward Observer (27)

PLUS --- Air Observer (10) (Acts as forward Air
Controller only to extent needed to
identify target, to strike aircraft)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DIVISION ARTILLERY
FSCC
ONLY

PERSONNEL

QUALIFICATIONS

MAJOR ITEMS

ADDITIONAL
for Air
Support
Control

2 - Radio Operators, Medium Speed¹

1 - Radio Technician, VHF

3 - Radio Operators, Medium Speed²

1 - Air Liaison Officer

Must be able to repair and maintain VHF equipment assigned to Division Artillery Units

As determined by Air Force. (Must be qualified to coordinate and supervise close air support operations)

2 - ANVRC - 1

1 - SCR 624 (VHF)

2 - 3/4 ton 4x4

1 - 1/4 ton 4x4 with trailer

1 - SCR 399

1 - Operate ANVRC - 1

2 - Operate SCR 399

DIVISION ARTILLERY LIGHT AIR SECTION

PERSONNEL

QUALIFICATIONS

MAJOR ITEMS
(EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZED FOR
UNITS OF DIVISION ARTILLERY)*

ADDITIONAL 1 - Forward Air Controller
for Air
Support
Control

As determined by the Air Force.
(Must be able to supervise air
observers of Artillery Light
Aviation Section in the use of
air to air communication equip-
ment to assist in the identifica-
tion of targets to strike aircraft
in the target area.)

10 - VHF Radios. (Portable, a
minimum of four multiple channels).
4-12 volts wet battery or standard
dry cell operated.

*Based on L-19 type equipped with
SCR 619 for communication in
Artillery Net and SCR 300 for com-
munication with Infantry elements.

REGIMENT

PERSONNEL	QUALIFICATIONS	MAJOR ITEMS
		(AUTHORIZED FOR UNITS OF DIVISION ARTILLERY)
<u>Organic</u> for Artillery Control	Artillery Liaison Officer ¹ (Captain) 1 - Driver Radio Operator	Graduate The Artillery School. An officer experienced in artillery tactics and techniques 1 - 1/4 ton 4x4 1 - SCR 608
<u>ADDITIONAL</u> for Air Support Control	Artillery Liaison Officer ¹ 2 - Radio Operators, Medium Speed 1 - Air Liaison Officer	Graduate Air Close Support Course 1 - 3/4 ton 4x4 1 - ANVRC - 1 As determined by Air Force. (Must be qualified to coordi- nate and supervise Close Air Support operations)
	1 - Organic Regimental Liaison Officer from Field Artillery Battalion	

INFANTRY BATTALION

PERSONNEL	QUALIFICATIONS	MAJOR ITEMS (AUTHORIZED FOR UNITS OF DIVISION ARTILLERY)
<p><u>Organic</u> for Artillery Control</p>	<p>Artillery Liaison Officer¹ (Captain) 4 - Liaison Party enlisted men</p>	<p>Graduate The Artillery School - An officer experienced in ar- tillery tactics and techniques.</p> <p>1 - 1/4 ton 4x4 1 - SCR 608</p>
<p><u>ADDITIONAL</u> for Air Support Control</p>	<p>Artillery Liaison Officer¹ 2 - Radio operators, Medium speed</p>	<p>Graduate Air Close Support Course. (Must be able to use ground air communication equipment to request aircraft and to assist in identification of targets to aircraft over target area.)</p> <p>1 - 1/4 ton 4x4 1 - ANVRC - 1 1 - ANTRC - 7 (Portable)</p>

1 - Organic Battalion Liaison Officer from Field Artillery Battalion.

SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL AND MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

FURNISHED BY PRESENT SYSTEM PROPOSED SYSTEM CHANGES REQUIRED UNDER
PROPOSED SYSTEM

AIR FORCE

Officers -----	4	-----	5
Enlisted Men-----	8		
1/4 ton 4x4 -----	12		
1/4 ton trailer-----	4		
3/4 ton 4x4 -----	0		
ANVRC - 1 -----	8		
ANTRC - 7 -----	4		
SCR 522 -----	4		
SCR 624 -----	0		


Officers-----add-----	1
Enlisted men----- add-----	19
1/4 ton 4x4-----delete -----	2
1/4 ton trailer-----delete -----	3
3/4 ton 4x4-----add-----	5
ANVRC - 1-----add-----	6
ANTRC - 7-----add-----	5
SCR 522-----delete -----	3
SCR 624-----add-----	1
VHF Radio, Portable---add-----	10

ARMY

Enlisted Men-----	3	-----	30
1/4 ton 4x4 ---		-----	10
1/4 ton trailer-----		-----	1
3/4 ton 4x4 ---		-----	14
ANTRC -7-----		-----	9
SCR 522 -----		-----	1
SCR 624 -----		-----	1
SCR 399-----	1	-----	1
VHF Radio, Portable-----		-----	10



SCR 193
 SCR 619
 SCR 399
 SCR 608
 AN/TRC-7
 AN/VRC-1



NOTE 1:

- a. Equipment and circuits illustrated in solid lines are organic to the units portrayed.

NOTE 2:

- a. Radio equipment illustrated in double lines is additional equipment necessary for efficient operation of the FSCC and implementation of close tactical air support.
- b. The employment of this additional equipment is indicated in broken lines.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TACTICAL AIR REQUEST NET

ROK DIVISIONS

(SUPPLEMENT TO ARMY TACTICAL
AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENT AND
INFANTRY BATTALION TACP'S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS X CORPS
APO 909 US ARMY

21 February 1951

TACTICAL AIR REQUEST NET - ROK DIVISIONS

1. PROBLEM: To provide air support for ground units when TACP's are not available below regimental level.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

a. That Air Force TACP's will be available only to regimental level in some elements of the attacking force.

b. That communications will exist between regimental and higher headquarters.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. Normally TACP communications with higher headquarters are through ground communication channels.

b. All requests for air support are the responsibility of ground commanders, to higher headquarters, and are through ground communication channels.

c. Any alternate means of communications that quickly sends information up the chain of command is acceptable.

4. DISCUSSION:

a. When TACP's are stationed at regimental level only, their function becomes that of a coordinator and air traffic direction center. From their normal battle station they can seldom observe enough of the regimental area to adjust the fire of all close support aircraft. This problem, of course, does not exist when the desirable number of TACP's (one per Bn) is available. With only one TACP per regiment, target information, friendly troop locations and other coordination data which cannot be gathered by personal observation are required. One dependable means of transmitting target information to this regimental TACP is by means of the Artillery communications channels. In the case of ROK Divisions it was found necessary, in recent large-scale offensive operations, to support them with US artillery. This gave the added firepower and the necessary communications. The organization shown in Inclosure 1 was effected for the support of three ROK Infantry Divisions assigned the attack mission in X Corps "OPERATION ROUNDUP", an attack to destroy the II and V NK Corps (4-11 Feb 51) in the HOENGSONG-HONG-CHON area. Target information was transmitted through artillery channels to the Artillery Liaison Officer at regimental level. TACP's working in conjunction with the Artillery Liaison Officer monitored the reports for target informations. The information was planned to terminate in the Division or Corps FSCC where a re-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

quest for air support was made. Upon arrival of strike aircraft which were vectored to the regimental TACP, artillery marked the target area or friendly lines as required, and the regimental TACP directed aircraft to the target area by giving necessary target information.


5. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. The communication network described in Inclosure 1 can be organized with existing facilities.
- b. This method is less effective than employing the optimum of one TACP per battalion.
- c. This alternate means of air support communication system makes maximum use of a limited number of TACP's.




6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That in the situation where TACP's are stationed at regimental level only, they be located with the Artillery Liaison Officer or in the Artillery Fire Direction Center.
- b. That artillery forward observers be employed to transmit target information to TACP's at regimental level.
- c. That artillery liaison officers and TACP's integrate their efforts to render fire support as required.

TACTICAL AIR REQUEST NET ROK DIVISION



LEGEND

- KMAG** KOREAN MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP
-  **US FIELD ARTY FORWARD OBSERVER(S)**
-  **US FIELD ARTY BN LNO AT REG'TL HQ**
-  **TACP**
USAF TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY AT REG'TL HQ

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED